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Nowadays and more generally, discrepancies in economic growth between otherwise
similar countries are vast and in a large extent unexplained by economic theory.
Economists in their endeavour of disentangling this puzzle bring education in the
frontline as empirical evidence indicates that in some cases reforms in education are
significant in explaining shifts in economic performance. This thesis consists of three
papers which address different questions in related fields regarding the economics of
education.
The second chapter of this thesis concerns the effect of releasing information to stu-
dents about their relative performance within their school and nationwide. Knowing
how one’s characteristics compare to those of other individuals is important in every
setting of economic decision making. This chapter examines the effects of provid-
ing relative performance information on students’ short and long term outcomes. I
exploit a large scale natural experiment that took place in Greece. Using unique
primary data on students’ performance throughout senior high school, we find an
asymmetric response to feedback: high-achieving students improve their final-year
performance by 0.15 of a standard deviation, whereas the final-year performance
of low-achieving students drops by 0.3 of a standard deviation. The results are
consistently more pronounced for females indicating greater sensitivity to feedback.
I also document the long-term effects of feedback: high-achieving students reduce
their repetition rate for the national exams; they enrol into university departments
that are more selective by 0.15 of a standard deviation and their expected annual
earnings increase by 0.17 of a standard deviation. By contrast, the results for low-
achieving students are negative. I provide suggestive evidence that feedback encour-
ages students from low-income neighbourhoods to enrol in university and to study
in higher-quality programs, which may, in the long run, reduce income inequality.
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The third chapter of this thesis examines the extent to which college decisions
among adolescents depend on the decisions of their peers. In the recent years,
the importance of one’s group of peers-be that friends, colleagues, neighbors- has
been widely emphasized in the literature. In this paper, I ask whether individuals
derive utility from conformity in college enrolment. I propose a new methodology in
mitigating reflection and endogeneity issues in identifying social interactions. The
instrument that I propose is the percentage of females in one’s school, neighbourhood
and preferacture the year before. Evidence from the psychology literature support
our assumption that the prevalence of females creates a less violent and disruptive
environment. I exploit a special institutional setting, in which schools are very close
to each other, allowing for students from different schools to interact. I investigate
utility spillovers from the educational choices of students in consecutive cohorts.
Spatial variation allows us to identify social interactions in groups of various sizes,
using a new dataset that spans the universe of high school graduates. I find positive
and significant externalities in the decision to enrol in college among peers who
belong to the same social group. Results indicate that students who attend high
school with 10% more classmates who enrol in college are 4.5 % percentage points
more likely to themselves attend college.
In the forth chapter, I investigate the causal effect of school attendance on
students’ performance. I exploit a natural experiment that changed the school
absences allowance for the high achieving students in order to identify the effect of
school attendance on educational outcomes. I use a novel dataset that contains class
attendance information about students in eleventh and twelfth grade. The natural
experiment took place in Greece in 2007 and provided higher performing students
with 50 more hours of excused absences from school. I start off by using a Regression
Discontinuity approach in order to measure the change in total absences and exam
score due to the reform around the cut-off. The regression discontinuity cannot find
an effect around the cut-off. The reason behind that is that the effect might not
be caused by students around the threshold but by students in the right tail of the
performance distribution. Next, I employ a combination of differences-in-differences
and instrumental variables techniques in order to identify returns to absences. Our
estimates show significant negative returns to absences.
2
Chapter 2
Knowing who you are: The
Effect of Feedback Information




Improving pupils’ attainments has been an important issue for policy makers and
academics alike. In an effort to improve students’ grades, education policies have
focused on improving school inputs such as reducing class size (Angrist and Lavy
1999, Krueger 1999), improving the quality of teachers (Chetty et al. 2014, Rothstein
2010, Aaronson et al. 2007), extending the term length (Card and Krueger 1992)
and improving the quality of the peer group a student is exposed to (Lavy et al.
2012, Zimmerman 2003a, Hoxby 2000b). All these interventions are significantly
more costly than manipulating the availability of social comparison information.
However, little is known about whether providing social comparison information
enhances students’ performance.
This paper presents a theoretical motivation and empirical analysis of whether
providing high school students with social comparison information regarding their
performance in externally marked high stake exams affects future performance in
similar exams. Our analysis relies on the fact that different cohorts have different
policies regarding the provision of feedback. The feedback policies we observe differ
based on whether students receive information about their ordinal rank position at
the end of the eleventh grade.
We exploit a large scale natural experiment that took place in Greece in
2005. Until 2005, all students were provided with relative performance information
in a series of externally graded national exams prior to University admission high
stake exams. In this regime, all students had to take national exams in two adjacent
grades; one year before graduation from high-school and the year they graduated
from high school (feedback regime). This system allowed students to receive infor-
mation about their relative performance in the penultimate year. Knowing their
performance in the penultimate year exams, students could translate their hours of
effort into exam result. In the feedback regime, each student’s performance in the
eleventh grade exams was publicly announced, giving students the opportunity to
calculate their national and school rank. So students could compare themselves to
others allowing for social comparison. Knowing their relative performance in the
eleventh grade could affect the amount of effort students decide to exert towards
their twelfth grade performance (Ertac 2005). Students’ performance in the twelve
grade national exams is the most important determinant for University admission
in this setting.
After 2005, the penultimate year national exams are abolished and replaced
by school exams. This means that after 2005, penultimate year students sit exams on
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the same subjects as before but they now receive report cards with their own grades
only. As a consequence, they no longer receive information about their penultimate
year relative performance. These cohorts -as the previous ones- sit national exams in
the twelfth grade that will determine their post-secondary placement. However, they
have been imposed a loss of feedback information regarding previous performance
in similar exam (non-feedback regime).
Using new data on school performance, school quality and national exams
for university admission, we test the hypothesis that students’ final year exam per-
formance is independent of the feedback regime. Conditional on their tenth grade
performance, we compare the final year performance of students across feedback
regimes. After controlling for students’ characteristics, we identify the effect of
feedback provision on their short term (academic performance in the University en-
trance exams) and their long term outcomes (repetition of national exams one year
after graduation, popularity of University Department admitted to and expected
annual earnings).
Our first finding is that high achieving students perform better in externally
graded exams when they are aware of their relative performance in the school and
nationwide. Feedback information on past performance improves the next period’s
exam performance of the better students by 0.2 standard deviations and their rel-
ative national rank by 4-6 percentiles. This is of comparable magnitude to being
taught by a teacher 1.5-2 standard deviations above the average ( Chetty et al.
2014, Hanushek et al. 2005) or to reducing the class size by 15 percent. (Angrist
and Lavy 1999, Krueger 1999). Additionally, we find evidence that the performance
of students in the lower percentiles deteriorates when feedback is provided. In par-
ticular, their consecutive year performance declines by 0.3 standard deviations and
their national rank decreases by 6-8 percentiles. To build intuition here, we consider
that knowing how someone performs relatively to others in the same task affects his
motivation to exert less or further effort in the next time period. (Ertac 2005)
Our second finding suggests differential response to feedback at different
parts of the ability distribution by gender. Females seem to be considerably more
sensitive to feedback at all parts of the ability distribution than males. In particular,
high achieving males and females respond positively to positive feedback whereas
low achieving male and female students respond negatively to negative feedback.
Our results are consistent with the existing literature findings regarding gender
differential response to feedback information due to initial different levels of self-
confidence (McCarty 1986).
Our third finding is that the provision of feedback changes the matching
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of students to University Departments. After ranking all University Departments
based on their popularity and cut-offs, we find that feedback provision makes high
(low) achieving students move up (down) the University Departments popularity
ladder by 30 (35) programs which is 0.15 (0.18) of a standard deviation. We then
map each program with the annual earnings of older graduates. We find that when
feedback is provided, high (low) achieving students experience an increase (decrease)
in the expected earning by 0.13 (0.23) standard deviations. In absolute terms, we
find evidence that feedback alters the socio-economic background composition of
students who manage to get admitted to the top programs. More students from
low income neighbourhoods get admitted to the most selective programs with the
highest expected earnings after graduation (like engineering and law), when feedback
information is provided. This means that feedback information encourages social
elevation motivated by students from low income families.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first large scale study that documents
the short and long term effects of feedback provision using a natural experiment. In
particular, we document the direction and size of the effect of feedback information
on students’ attainments, post-secondary placement and expected earnings. We
exploit a special setting where high school students receive information about their
relative position in two reference groups (school and country). Thus, we define
feedback as the information of one’s performance in comparison to their peers in
school and nationwide.
We also discuss the two most prevailing mechanisms that could explain how
students react to the social comparison information and are related to students: 1)
learning about own relative ability and/or 2) learning about the quality of the school.
The mechanism that best accommodates all our findings is the first one with the
second helping us rule out alternative interpretations of the results. This approach
may seem as a departure from the usual behavioural formula, where individuals are
only uncertain about other agents’ type. Although someone may observe his own
perspicacity, they do not generally observe everyone’s performance so as to deduce
a useful assessment of their own relative performance. We provide evidence that
feedback provision can change good allocation in such environments.
In the recent years there has been an increasing interest in the economic
literature of feedback information provision on exam performance.1 Bandiera et al.
1The relative feedback information has been studied in the tournament literature. Some studies
find that relative performance information has a positive effect for all participants in tournaments
and piece rate payment schemes (Hannan et al. 2008). On the other hand, some other studies find
mixing results. Barankay 2012 uses data on furniture salesmen’s effort and finds that feedback has
negative effects on the low performing employees.)
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2008 examine the effect of feedback information on students’ future absolute perfor-
mance using data for University students registered to Departments with different
feedback policies. In that study, feedback is defined as the knowledge of someone’s
absolute performance in the midterm exam in period one and before students exert
effort on their essay in period two. The authors find that the effect of feedback
is positive for all students and more pronounced for more able students. However,
their study refers to feedback involving own performance. The provision of feedback
regarding relative performance has not received much attention.
The paper which is most closely related to ours is a study by Azmat and
Iriberri 2010. The authors examine the effect of relative performance feedback on
students future absolute performance. They exploit a natural experiment that took
place in a high school, where for one year only students received information about
the average class score in addition to their own performance. Their findings suggest
that feedback improves the performance of all students in the subsequent test. hey
also find no differential effect by gender along the ability distribution. A key differ-
ence to our work is that they use a small sample of one high school while we use
a sample of 134 senior high schools nationally representative in many dimensions.
Another important difference is that Azmat and Iriberri 2010 investigate the effect
of providing information about someone’s class rank. We contribute to the litera-
ture by examining the effects of providing broader social comparison information
about someone’s school and national rank. More recently and in a related litera-
ture, Murphy and Weinhardt 2014 examine the effect of knowing one’s ordinal rank
position in exam results on future exam performance. They find large and robust
effects of being highly ranked in primary school on secondary school achievement.
Their study also reports that boys are more affected by knowing their ordinal rank
than girls. Students figure out their rank within their class from social interaction
with their classmates. In our setting, the information set is greater and is provided
by the principal. Students receive explicit information regarding their rank position
within the school and nationwide which facilitates the policy recommendations.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model
for the individual’s behaviour and motivates the empirical investigation. Section
3 provides a brief description of the institutional setting and the data. Section 4
sets out our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results on short and
long term outcomes and discusses heterogeneous feedback effects by ability, gender,
track and neighbourhood income. Section 6 discusses the threats to identification




We adapt a theoretical model proposed by Ertac 2005 2 where students have imper-
fect information about their own ability.
In the non-feedback regime eleventh graders take school exams and they
receive information about their own performance only. In the feedback regime, they
receive information about their own performance and about the school and cohort
average performance. Students engage in a task in two time periods; the eleventh
and the twelfth grade. Students’ performance in the eleventh grade depends on
their ability and the easiness of the task. This performance provides them with
some information about ability and easiness of the exam 3; we will refer to that as
the private signal si. The ability of a student is denoted by αi > 0 and αi’s are
independent draws from the same distributions and independent of task difficulty.
All distributions are common knowledge.
When signals coming from the eleventh grade are realized, students update
their beliefs about the ability and decide the subsequent effort. The amount of
effort students decide to exert in the twelfth grade determines their final year’s
scores. Period 1: This is the learning stage. Students receive a noisy signal about
their ability:
si = αi + n , i = 1, 2, ....
αi ∼ N(α¯, σ2), α¯ > 0
n ∼ N(0, ψ2)
cov(αi, n) = 0, cov(α1, α2 = 0)
This signal (si) depends on student’s i ability level (αi) and a shock (n) that
is common to all students 4ie. the easiness of the exam. We also assume that αi
and n are normally distributed and αi and si are jointly normally distributed. In
2Ertac 2005 presents a principal-multiple agents model where agents have imperfect information
about their abilities under multiple types of contracts. The model is also used by Azmat and Iriberri
2010. The natural experiment they study gives students information about the average grade of the
class, while here the social comparison information refers to the average school and cohort grade.
3In the feedback regime n refers to the easiness of the national exams. In the non-feedback
regime n refers to the easiness of the school exam.
4In the school or the cohort depending on the feedback or non-feedback regime.
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The type of the signal each student receives, affects student’s perceived belief
about his own ability in the first period. A student’s belief about his own ability
determines the amount of effort he chooses to exert in the second period. Then we
find student’s i expectation of his own ability conditional on the signal he observes
in each case 5. In the non-feedback regime the student observes his own performance
in the school exams. His expected ability given the observed signal is:
E(αi|si) = α¯+ σ
2(si − α¯)
σ2 + ψ2
In the feedback regime, the student receives information about the average perfor-
mance in his school but also nationally:
E(αi|si, s¯) = α¯+ (σ
2 + ψ2)(si − α¯)− ψ2(s¯− α¯)
σ2 + 2ψ2
The higher the private signal a student receives, the higher is his belief about per-
ceived ability. If the average signal is observed, then the belief about ability decreases
with it.
Period 2: Following the realisation of the signals, students choose in the
second period the amount of effort to exert. Notice here that there is no pass-
fail scheme and students do not try to achieve a specific performance threshold.
University cut-offs are determined endogenously based on demand and pre-specified
supply of seats. In other words, we assume that ability and effort are complements
in the production function. 6 Assuming that the performance production is a linear
function in effort 7 and that effort and ability are complements in performance8 it
follows that: qi = eiαi. There is also a cost associated with the effort exerted that is





 σ2 σ2 σ2/Nσ2 σ2 + ψ2 (σ2 +Nψ2)/N
σ2/N (σ2 +Nψ2)/N (σ2 +Nψ2)/N

6In a different setting where university cut-offs are pre-determined, effort and ability could be
substitutes in the production function. In that case, a student who is above average in the eleventh
grade may choose to exert less effort in the twelfth grade in order to achieve a specific performance
threshold.
7 The predictions of the model do not change if the performance function is not linear in effort.





c(ei) and is increasing in effort and convex.
9 In the second period, students choose
the effort level ei > 0 in order to maximise their last year’s utility function. In the
absence of feedback students receive only the private signal and they maximise:
uNF = E[qi − c(ei)|si] = E[αi|si]ei − c(ei)
and the F.O.C simplifies to E[αi|si]− c′(eNF∗i ) = 0 (1)
In the feedback regime each student observes the average signal and max-
imises:
uF = E[qi − c(ei)|si, s¯] = E[αi|si, s¯]ei − c(ei)
and the F.O.C simplifies to E[αi|si, s¯]− c′(eF∗i ) = 0 (2)
Given that the F.O.Cs are sufficient, we will compare the optimal effort levels
in the two regimes. The conditional expectation of ability is independent of effort
while the second term in (1) and (2) is an increasing function of effort. That means
that an increase in the beliefs about ability -a higher self confidence level- leads to
an increase in the optimal effort level. The comparison of the F.O.Cs for the two
regimes simplifies to the comparison of the conditional expected abilities.




Thus, if si > s
∗ then eF∗ > eNF∗ and if si < s∗ then eF∗ < eNF∗. 10.
Students with signal above (below) s∗ will put in more (less) effort, when feedback
is provided. If s¯ = α¯ then the exam is neither hard nor easy. If s∗ = α¯ which means
that s∗ = s¯ and the average signal equals the average ability level and eF∗ = eNF∗.
However, if s∗ > α¯ then s∗ > s¯ and if s∗ < α¯ then s∗ < s¯. That means that if the
signal is above the average signal then students will exert more effort when feedback
is provided. Similarly, if the signal is below the average signal then students will
exert less effort when feedback is provided.
If s¯ > α¯ then the exam was hard and the signal needed in order for students
to exert more effort is higher than the average signal(s∗ > s¯). If s¯ < α¯ then the
exam was easy and the signal needed in order for students to exert more effort is
lower than the average signal(s∗ < s¯)
Let us summarize now the main hypothesis about the effect of the eleventh
grade social comparison information on the twelfth grade performance.




> 1 provided than N >= 2
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Null Hypothesis: Students do not react to the social comparison
information
That would suggest that students are not uncertain about their ability or
that students have already figured out their relative performance information and
the explicit addition of it is redundant or that the private signal that students get
in the feedback regime equals the average signal.
Alternative Hypothesis: Positive effect on performance for high
ability students and negative effect on performance for low ability stu-
dents
That would suggest that students will react differently to feedback. Based
on the model, high ability students will perform better when the social comparison
information is provided because they have been encouraged by their period one
performance. On the other hand, low ability students will performance worse when
the social comparison information is provided because they have been discouraged
by their eleventh grade performance.
2.3 Institutional Setting and Data
2.3.1 Institutional Setting
In Greece, all students in secondary education are obliged to take the national
exams to have access to tertiary education. Students sit these national exams in
specific subjects on specific dates every year and the questions asked are the same
for all students across the country. All universities are public and the admission
procedure is run exclusively by the Ministry of Education. The University admission
in Greece is based on the “admission grade”. The admission grade is a weighted
average of the grades a student gets in the national exams (70% weight) and the
school grades (30% weight). The school grade of every subject is the average of the
term grades. Only final year students can participate in the university admission
procedure. Admission is made in a specific university department. All students are
examined on the General Education core modules. On the top of that, students
are examined on Elective subjects that are determined by the “speciality” or the
“track” they choose at the beginning of the twelfth year.
After the admission grades are announced, every student makes and submits
to the Ministry of Education a preference list of university departments he would
like to be admitted to in that year. If a student is admitted to a school in a higher
place in his preference list he cannot be admitted to those below that. That makes
students to be very careful in constructing their preference list. The only way
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a student can flee from the university admission procedure is to deny submitting
a list of preferences. Every university department admits a pre-specified number
of students. Then, each department admits the best students that have included
this department in their preference list. All students are compared to each other
according to their admission grades and every successful candidate is admitted to
the first department in his list where there is an available place and every student
with higher admission grade has already been allocated. The rest of the students
are denied admission at that year.
At the end, every department announces the grade of the last student it
admitted in that year. This grade is considered to be the “bottom grade” or the
“cut-off grade” in that year of a university department. More popular departments
exhibit higher bottom grades. Students are aware of the “ cut-off grades” of the
previous years. The ranking of university departments according to their cut-off
grades appears to stay largely unchanged, year after year, and this represents the
society’s valuation for these departments. It’s not possible to defer someone’s ad-
mission. Some students that have not been admitted to the university department
they wanted to may decide to retry admission a year (or more) after graduation
using their school grades in the admission procedure and retaking national exams in
all subjects. Those students usually do not attend any school/college or pursue any
job or do military service after graduation and before the next admission period.
2.3.2 Data Collection
The transition from high school to higher education is based on a centralised allo-
cation of students to University Departments. The Hellenic Ministry of Education
collects data on all students on the years that they sit national exams. The perfor-
mance of students in previous grades can only be found in the archives of the school
they attended. Thus, we visited senior High schools across the country and we have
constructed a database of detailed student performance in every subject throughout
senior high school. In particular, we have collected data from a large randomised
sample of 134 schools across the country. Our novel dataset combines information
from various sources:
1. Administrative data provided by the Ministry of Education regarding the
twelfth grade performance of all students who sat the twelfth grade national
exams from 2003 to 2009. This dataset contains student level information
about gender, national and school exam results in each subject nationally ex-
amined in twelfth grade, name of senior High school attended, year of birth and
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graduation year from senior High school, speciality chosen at the beginning of
twelfth grade. It also contains University admission related information such
as the University Department each student got admitted to, number of appli-
cations made to University Departments and the reported ordinal preference
position of the University Department admitted in someone’s preference list.
The dataset refers to the period 2003-2009 and gives us information about
435.589 students.
2. As the Ministry does not collect information on students’ tenth grade per-
formance, we collected this information directly from the schools.11 More
specifically, we have physically collected data from 13412 public, experimen-
tal 13 and private schools both near big cities and in the countryside (this
number corresponds to around 10 % of the school population). We exclude
the evening schools14 from our analysis because they differ in many aspects
from the other types of schools. 15 This dataset includes information about
school and/or national exam results in tenth, eleventh and twelfth grade in
all subjects, indicators for gender, a class indicator, graduation year, year of
birth, speciality chosen at the beginning of the eleventh and twelfth grade and
a unique identification code for each student that stays the same throughout
senior high school. We have had short interviews with the principal of every
school in our sample to find out about any effects potentially affecting our out-
comes of interest. Inter alia, principals were asked about the size and history
of the school, facilities, attrition and teacher quality. The matching between
the dataset provided by the Ministry of Education and the school datasets was
almost perfect 16 providing us with a complete senior high school performance
history for 45.746 students which is our sample size.
3. The Ministry of Economy and Finance provided us with average household
income information for 2009 for every postcode in the country. We employ
this as a proxy for neighbourhood income.
11The tenth grade performance data are recorded in each school’s archives either in their com-
puters or in their history books.
12 We exclude from the analysis schools that had at least one year school cohort size smaller than
ten students because these small schools may be atypical in some dimensions.
13Experimental schools are public schools where admission in these schools is based on a ran-
domised lottery.
14Which are public schools but lessons take place in the evening targeting employed students.
15University cut-offs differ for students graduating from evening schools compared to any other
type of school.
16 92 % of students matched because of missing values regarding the year of birth or the gender
of the student in the school data.
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4. The Ministry of Internal Affairs provided us with urban density information.
Urban areas are those with more that 20,000 inhabitants.
5. The National Statistical Authority provided us with the Labour Force Sur-
vey data for the year 2003. We use quarterly data to create a variable that
maps college occupations into annual earnings 17. Respondents report their
occupation with high precision.18 The earnings data are grouped into ten bins
indicating the ten national deciles with the highest frequency. We use the
lowest bound of each bin 19 to construct a variable that measures minimum
expected annual earnings from each occupation.
Every school follows the same curriculum and students are assigned to pub-
lic schools based on a school district system. This school district system assigns
students to schools based on geographical distance. Students are alphabetically
assigned to classes in tenth grade and then they do not change class throughout
senior high school. Moreover, teachers are allocated to public schools based on geo-
graphical criteria and no quality criteria are taken into consideration in the process.
Figure 2.1 presents the geographic position of each school included in the sample.
The density of the school population in Athens is 32 % thus many of the schools in
our sample are located in Athens.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics about the available variables in the
sample in the twelfth grade. The variable ”internal migration” takes the value one
if the district of University Department the student is admitted to is different from
the district of residence; the latter being proxied by the school district. Moreover,
the variable ”early enrolment” takes the value of one if the student enrols in the
first grade before the age of six 20. Interestingly, 82 % of the students on average
get admitted to at least one University Department. Given that there are no fixed
cut-offs, if there is not much demand for a particular University Department the
cut-off grade in that year is very low.
Table 2.2 reports the mean characteristics of the schools in our sample and the
whole school population to investigate if our sample is a representative one. There
are some variables for which there is a statistically significant difference between the
134 sample schools and the population of schools and these differences are mainly
17 We also map college fields to occupations.
18209 classified occupations are reported and respondent have to indicate which one is closest to
their actual one.
19Multiplied by 12 months.
20 According to the law, this happens if the student is born in the first quarter of the calendar
year.
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related to the sampling methods that we use 21. So the sample may not be fully
representative of national responses, but it looks pretty similar nonetheless.
2.3.3 How does feedback work?
Knowing one’s own relative performance might affect the amount of effort a student
exerts with regard to a certain objective. In the context of our study, the student’s
objective is to maximize his or her score and/or rank at the end of high school.
Consider a student in the treated group. In the world of this experiment,
students compete with each other over access to a limited number of university
places. At the end of the penultimate year, students take standardized exams in
some subjects with external examiners and at least two anonymous external graders
per subject.
Then two mechanisms are in action. First, everyone’s results within the
school become public knowledge: the names and detailed grades are displayed at
the entrance of every school. This provides students with information about how
well they can do given a specific level of effort, when national exams come around
again. This means that students could calculate their distance from the school’s
average score, and their relative position within their school. Second, the names,
details about national exam scores, and the cohort’s average national exam score
are published in the newspaper. This means that each student could calculate her
distance from the national cohort’s average score and derive her relative national
rank. The students’ names and their grades are sorted based on an alphabetical
order.
We believe that students in the feedback regime calculate their eleventh grade
rank within the school and nationally given the importance of their performance
in the senior year exams. Knowing a student’s national rank provides them with
information about the competition in that year. Each year the newspaper reports
the following: cohort’s average national exam score, the cohort’s minimum and
maximum score, the score that corresponds to each decile and comparisons with
last year’s statistics. For each student the following is reported: student’s first
name, surname and father’s name, score given by the first and the second examiners
(Figure 2.3 and 2.4). This is published separately for each subject. The score given
by each examiner ranges from 0 to 100. If the difference between the score given by
the first and the second examiners is not greater than 13/100, then the final score
21i.e. the relative percentage of schools in Athens for which we collected data is higher than
the relative percentage of schools in Athens. Furthermore, our sample contains 5 % fewer private
schools than the population.
15
is the average score between the scores given by the first and the second examiners.
Otherwise, the final score is the average between the highest two scores given by
any examiners. The raw final score used a 1-to-20 scale that we transformed into
z-scores to facilitate the interpretation of the results.
Students use this information to calculate their national rank. Given that
the names are alphabetically sorted, calculating a student’s rank using even a single
newspaper’s scores is already a good indicator of a student’s national rank. Calcu-
lating the school rank is much easier given that the average school cohort consists
of 79 students.
Consider a student in the control group. During the penultimate year of
senior high school, he chooses an effort level to prepare for his exams, which are
now given only at the school level. Within the school, teachers coordinate to cover
the same material, and usually give the same exam questions. Before the summer
break in the penultimate year, our student takes exams on the same five subjects,
and receives a written report from school with his own grades. When he reaches
twelfth grade, he has access to the same material, study guides and past exam papers
as any student in the treated group. However, he is unaware of how his schoolmates
and his cohort did relative to him in the penultimate year final exams. Table 2.3
reports the summary statistics of the variables of interest across the two regimes.
Some of the differences seem to be significantly different from zero but they are
either very small or economically non-meaningful. The exact timing is presented in
Figure 2.2.
2.3.4 Test Scores
Our prior measure of performance is based on the overall students’ performance
in the tenth grade (GPA). The tenth grade GPA takes into account a student’s
tenth grade performance in thirteen subjects. All tenth grade exams are school
exams. The performance in each subject is a weighted average of the final exam
result (50% weight) and the performance of a student during the school year (50%
weight). Teachers receive guidance on how to mark the final tenth-grade school
exam. We use the within-school rank of each student based on the tenth grade GPA
as a prior measure of performance. It is compulsory for all students to take exams
in all thirteen subjects in tenth grade.
Our main outcome variable is a student’s twelfth grade rank in two reference
groups (the school and nationally). These outcome variables -the within school
and the national rank- take into account students’ twelfth grade performance in
five core-education subjects. Students take exams at the end of the twelfth grade
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in these core-education subjects. A student’s performance in these five subjects is
the most important determinant for the calculation of the high-school graduation
grade under both regimes. Before 2005, these five subjects were all examined at a
national level. From 2005 onwards, two subjects are examined at a national level
whereas the other three subjects are examined at a school level. This change in the
number of subjects examined at a national and school level happened in the same
year as the abolition of feedback. We do various robustness checks later to examine
if this change affects our results. In particular, we use various outcome variables
(the rank in each subject separately; the average rank in those subjects examined
at the national level; or the average rank in the five core-education subjects) and
the estimated effects follow the same patterns. We call the core-education subjects
“incentivized”, because performance in these subjects is taken into account in the
calculation of the admission grade.
All schools in the sample offer three academic tracks in the twelfth grade.
Each student has to choose the academic track that is relevant to the post-secondary
degree they desire to pursue. Each track offers different subjects. Depending on the
track students choose, they take national exams in four track-specific subjects in
both regimes 22 We do not include the test scores in these four subjects in the
main analysis because the choice of track is based on endogenous criteria, i.e.their
perceived differential ability or preferences for a particular degree after high school
graduation. Robustness checks show that the results remain almost unchanged when
the track-specific subjects are taken into account.
In addition to the core-education subjects and the track-specific subjects,
students take compulsory within-school exams in three subjects (Sociology, Religion
and Modern Greek Literature) in both grades; eleventh and twelfth. Students take
school exams at the end of the eleventh grade and each student receives a report
card. This report card shows each student’s own performance in these exams without
providing information about the class or school average score. In the twelfth grade,
students are examined again on these subjects without having previously received
any relative performance information in these three subjects. We call these subjects
“non-incentivized” because students’ performance in these subjects is not taken into
account in the calculation of the university admission grade in any of the regimes.
Students take these exams in both regimes. We use these subjects as the main
counterfactual group.
In our analysis, we use the rankings instead of absolute scores for a couple of
22 These four subjects differ from the one track to the other. The Tracks are: Classics, Exact
Science and Information Technology.
17
reasons. First, using the tenth-grade ranking allows us to make comparisons across
cohorts and across schools. Notice that we do not observe the different feedback
policies in the same year. Thus, we use the within-school rank of a student to
compare students who are exposed to different peer groups and teachers. Second,
a given twelfth-grade national exam score does not represent the same ability level
in different years. However, it is important to make sure that students of the same
ability obtain the same rank in different years. The comparison of students’ absolute
scores across cohorts would be problematic, if the difficulty of the exam changes
from one year to another. Additionally, calculating the ranking of a student in
each subject takes into account the potential difference in the difficulty of the exam
from one subject to another. Thus the ranking allows us to compare a students’
performance across different subjects. Also note that any school grade inflation
that might occur in the tenth grade does not affect our prior performance measure
(tenth grade GPA). Grade inflation would make the teacher more lenient in the
overall grading procedure, which implies that the ranking of the students remains
unaffected. The national exams in twelfth grade are externally graded. As a result,
the teacher in a student’s school has no way to affect their national exam final scores.
Furthermore, the national exam procedure does not receive any grade curving.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
This section identifies and magnifies the effect of relative performance information
on students’ exam performance. First , we define the rank measures that we use.
Second, we identify if there is an effect. Since we use as an outcome variable the rank
in the twelfth grade, the effect is -if anything- of a distributional nature. Then, we
discuss the empirical method in order to identify the effect of feedback on students’
last year relative performance.
2.4.1 Calculation of the rank
In order to calculate the relative rank of the student within his school in the tenth





where nisc is the ordinal rank position of student i within school s in cohort c
in tenth grade 23 and is increasing in GPA and N sc is the school cohort size of school
23Based on the average of the thirteen subjects, ie.the tenth grade GPA.
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s in cohort c. The higher the Rank10isc, the higher the rank position of student i in
tenth grade in his school s and cohort c. Moreover Rank10isc is bounded between
between 0 and 1, with the lowest rank pupil in each school having R10isc = 0.
The ranks of the student within his school in the twelfth grade and nationwide
are calculated using the following normalisations:
Rank − school12isc = kisc−1Kcs−1
Rank − nationwide12ic = ric−1Rc−1
Where kisc is the ordinal rank position of student i in school s in cohort c
in twelfth grade and is increasing in the national exam grade. Kcs is the cohort
size c in school s. The Rank − school12isc is projected into the [0,1] interval and
the lowest rank pupil in each school cohort has Rank − school12isc=0. Notice that
there are five exams/subjects, so we first find the ordinal rank of the student based
on the average in the five scores, and then we normalise it using the above formula.
Rank−nationwide12ic is calculated in a similar way but is irrespective of the school
the student attends. So both Rank − school12isc and Rank − nationwide12ic are
calculated based on the twelfth grade national exams in the incentivized subjects
but they measure relative performance in the school and the country respectively.
2.4.2 Identifying the effect
Figure 2.5 shows the fitted values of the twelfth grade rank nationwide for each
percentile of prior performance. We observe that the fitted regression line for the
feedback period is steeper than the non-feedback one, implying that feedback has
a positive effect on the better students and a negative effect on the students in the
lower part of the ability distribution. Thus, the better students are more likely to
end up higher in the twelfth grade rank distribution when feedback is provided.
The opposite holds for the worse students who are more likely to end up lower in
the twelfth grade rank distribution when they are aware of their previous relative
performance.
In the same direction, Figure 2.6 shows the average rank nationwide of each
performance group in the twelfth grade exams, conditional on students’ prior per-
formance. Cohorts up to 2005 have received feedback information and cohorts from
2006 onwards are used as a comparison group meaning that feedback is abolished.
We observe that the lines are parallel in the treatment period (cohorts 2003, 2004
and 2005). This means that the time trends for each quintile of prior performance
follow a similar pattern from year to year. Identification is achieved through a differ-
ence approach for each prior performance group. The 2006 cohort is the first cohort
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affected by the abolition of the relative performance information. We observe that
from 2005 to 2006 the slopes of the time trends change, meaning that the treatment
affected students in all performance groups considerably except the middle quintile,
which remained unchanged. In particular, the top quintile achieved a higher aver-
age rank nationwide in the twelfth grade when feedback was provided compared to
the period after 2006. The opposite applies to the bottom quintile where students
end up lower in the distribution of twelfth grade rank when they are aware of their
previous relative performance compared to the period after 2006.
Another important observation here, is that the slopes remain relatively sta-
ble after 2006, which is the first affected cohort. So, the change in the slope of the
time trends between 2005 and 2006 can be attributed to the abolition of the relative
performance information. We produce this figure using students’ rank nationwide
(Figure 2.6) and rank within the school (Figure 2.7).
2.4.3 Method
Here, we quantify the effect of feedback provision on future performance by adopting
two complementary strategies.
First, we use the following specification to estimate the effect of feedback
information on students’ later rank, conditional on their prior performance.
Rank − nationwide12ic = α+ βquintileFeedbackc ∗Quintiles10isc
+λquintileQuintiles10isc + ψFeedbackc +X
′γ + ψc + φs + ic (1a)
Rank− school12isc = µ+ δquintileFeedbackc ∗Quintiles10isc + κquintileQuintiles10isc
+ξFeedbackc +X
′ζ + θc + ωisc (1b)
where Quintiles10isc is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
student is in the corresponding quintile based on his tenth grade performance in his
school. Moreover, Feedbackc is a dummy variable equal to one if the student takes
the eleventh grade national exam ie. if the graduation year is smaller than 2006
(feedback regime). The parameter of interest β (δ) measures the effect of feedback
on student’s rank nationwide (within his school) in the subsequent year, conditional
on tenth grade performance. In some specifications, we control for unobserved time
and school invariant factors that may affect last year’s rank using time and school
fixed effects. Specification (1b) exploits within school variation, thus we use (1a)
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without the school fixed effects when we are interested in exploiting across schools
time invariant variation.
In addition to the first strategy, we now use the following difference spec-
ification to find the effect of feedback on each decile of students’ twelfth grade
performance. We run the following specifications for each decile of tenth grade
performance θ ∈ [0, 1] :
Rank − nationwide12icθ = δθ + αθXiθ + βθDc + ψc + icθ (2a)
Rank − school12iscθ = ωθ + αθXicθ + γθDc + θc + uiscθ (2b)
where δθ captures a performance group-specific fixed effect. The parameter of in-
terest β is estimated separately for each one of the ten deciles, including clusters
at the school level. A similar regression across all decile groups gives the pooled
OLS estimator of βθ which is exactly zero because as we explained before, the pro-
vision of feedback has a zero average effect. A negative coefficient of βθ (γθ) implies
that feedback induces a deterioration in the rank nationwide (within his school) for
students at this decile.
2.5 Main Results
2.5.1 Effect on performance
Main OLS results are reported in Table 2.4. This table shows the effect of feedback
on students’ twelfth-grade national exam performance for each quintile of prior
performance conditional on students’ and schools’ characteristics. The first column
corresponds to the basic specification (1a) without school and year fixed effects. The
dummy for the third tenth grade quintile is omitted as a point of comparison. This
shows that when feedback is provided, a student in the top quintile in his school
based on his tenth grade performance has a 0.042 percentile rank gain in his twelfth
grade national exam performance compared to a student who is in the median
quintile in his school, ceteris paribus. Similarly, a student who receives feedback
and is in the bottom quintile in his school based on his tenth grade performance
has a 0.088 percentile rank loss in his twelfth grade national performance compared
to a student in the median quintile in his school. In columns 2 and 3, we see that
the results in column 1 are robust when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
across schools and years respectively. Adding school and year fixed effects slightly
change the coefficients estimates, which remain statistically significant at an 1 %
significance level. In all specifications, we control for a set of pupil characteristics
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and we cluster the standard errors at the school level. These results support the
alternative hypothesis of the model discussed earlier.
Female students seem to receive a lower national exam rank in the incen-
tivized subjects. Additionally, students who are coming from high income neigh-
bourhoods and urban schools perform better in the incentivized subjects. Public
school is the omitted category regarding the school type. Students who attend
experimental and private schools get a higher rank nationwide in the incentivized
subjects compared to students in public schools. Furthermore, student who spe-
cialize in the science track experience a drop of 0.055 national percentile ranks in
the incentivized subjects compared to students who specialise in computer science
while students specialising in classics perform worse than students specialising in
computer science.
We now turn to specification (1b) where we exploit the within school vari-
ation and results are presented in Table 2.5. The effect of feedback on students’
within school performance in the incentivized subjects is reported in columns (1)
and (2) and in the non-icentivized subjects in columns (3) and (4). In the first
column, we show that students in the quintiles 5 and 4 (top ones) based on the
tenth grade performance benefit from feedback. This gain is associated with 0.045
and 0.040 school percentile ranks respectively compared to the third quintile. Sim-
ilarly, quintiles 2 and 1 (bottom ones) experience a loss of 0.038 and 0.079 school
percentile ranks, when feedback is provided. In column 2 we control for unobserved
heterogeneity across years and as we expect; results are similar to Table 2.4, column
3 when we conditioned out for unobserved heterogeneity across years and schools in
the national analysis.
Then, we replicate the same analysis but we now use the school rank in
the non-incentivized subjects as the outcome variable. As mentioned before, stu-
dents take school exams in these subjects in both regimes and grades (eleventh and
twelfth). This is a crucial placebo test because if students act as if they receive
feedback in these subjects, that would mean that our estimated effect of feedback
captures the effect of year unobservables that are not taken out by the year fixed
effects. A possible explanation in that case, that would still facilitate our interpre-
tation would be that students might react to feedback by studying more or less for
the school instead of the national exams. But still, we would not be able to allay
the concern that our estimated effect captures only the effect of feedback and not
something else. In columns 3 and 4, we find that the coefficients are not statistically
significant and there is no evidence that the provision of feedback affects students’
performance in these subjects. What is important here is that students do not
22
receive any social comparison information regarding the non-incentivized subjects
neither in the feedback regime nor in the non-feedback regime. These findings are in
line with our hypothesis that students change their effort choice and thus their next
year performance due to receiving information about their relative performance,
when feedback is provided.
We then run specification (2a) and in Figure 2.8 we plot the βθ coefficients of
the rank nationwide and the associated 95 % confidence interval. We observe that
receiving information about someone’s relative performance has a negative effect to
students below the forty-fifth percentile and a positive effect to students above it.
At the highest two deciles, the curve is slightly decreasing implying that there is a
ceiling effect. In other words, there is some upper bound on how much improvement
can feedback provision bring for the most able students. Thus, sitting similar exams
prior to university admission high stake exams improves (decreases) the relative
rank nationwide of the high (low) achieving students by up to 5 (8) percentiles.
In Figure 2.9, we report γθ coefficients and the associated 95 % confidence interval.
The estimated treatment effects on the rank within the school are very similar to the
ones found before in Figure 2.8. This happens because the school sample that we use
is a representative one in terms of many observed characteristics and so someone’s
rank nationwide might not differ a lot from his rank within his school. Figure 2.10
plots the treatment effect coefficients for the non-incentivized subjects that we use
as the main non-treated subjects and we explained before. In line with Table 2.5,
we find no evidence that the provision of feedback affects students’ performance in
these subjects.
The original score in each subject varies from 0 to 20. We standardise the
twelfth grade scores in each year and school so that is has a zero mean and a standard
deviation of one. The treatment effects line for each decile of prior performance is
presented in Figure 2.11. There, the gain (loss) for students above (below) the 40th
percentile is up to 0.15 (0.3) standard deviations.
2.5.2 Gender and Track
Next, we turn into the gender analysis. As literature on evaluating social programs
has shown, individuals respond differently to the same policy (Heckman 2001). To
test whether boys react differently than girls to the provision of feedback, we esti-
mate the following regression:
Rank − nationwideic = δ + βFeedbackc ∗ Femalei + κFeedbackc
+λFemalei + αXi + µt + ic (3a)
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Rank − schoolisc = δ + βFeedbackc ∗ Femalei + κFeedbackc
+λFemalei + αXi + µt + isc (3b)
where Xi includes the tenth grade GPA performance, a dummy for early
enrolment in school and dummies for the speciality chosen in the twelfth grade.
OLS results are shown in Table 2.7. Although girls outperform boys, girls end up in
a lower later rank on average when feedback is provided. This is the case when we
consider both; the rank nationwide and the rank within their school. 24 Running
specification (2b) 25 for boys and girls separately, produces Figure 2.13 that presents
the treatment lines for boys (on the left) and girls (on the right).
For both genders, the effect of feedback is positive for high achieving stu-
dents and negative for low achieving students. We make two important points here:
First, in Table 2.7 the average effect of feedback on boys’ last year rank is positive
and on girls’ is negative as shown by the horizontal line which is generated by a
regression across all deciles (Figure 2.13). Second, the effects of feedback are more
pronounced for women. As indicated by the steeper treatment line, girls exhibit
greater sensitivity to knowing how well they do compared to their school or cohort
peers.
Our evidence are consistent with the literature supporting differential gender
effect to feedback with females responding more to additional information. McCarty
1986 in an experimental context, shows that women may react differently than men
in the absence of feedback information because of different levels of self-confidence.
Using an experimental context too, Franz et al. 2009 argue that women never have
the same level of self-confidence as men because women expect less of themselves
than men do.
Then, we disaggregate the analysis at the Track level. There are three Tracks:
Classics, Exact Science and Information Technology and students have to take four
exams within each track 26. In Figure 2.16, we run specification (2a) separately for
each track. The least average effect is observed for students in the Science Track
whereas the treatment curve is steeper for students in the Information Technology
Track rather than in Classics.
24In Table 2.7, if we include school fixed effects in specifications (3) and (4), we account for
heterogeneity across schools and the coefficient estimates become the same as in columns(1) and
(2).
25(2a) gives almost identical results as (2b) for both genders.
26In Classics they take national exams in: Ancient Greek, Latin, Literature and History. In Sci-
ence the examined subjects are: Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Biology and in Information
Technology: Computers, Mathematics, Physics and Business Administration.
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2.5.3 Long Term Outcomes
In this section we examine the effect of feedback provision on students’ long term
outcomes. We have already motivated the discussion regarding the reasons a student
would choose to resit the national exams for university admission. We use binary
response models to examine if the provision of feedback affects the decision to retake
the exam. In Table 2.10, we observe that a significant percentage out of the cohort
population repeats the exam one year after graduation from senior high school27.
We define as ”misplacement” the difference between the tenth grade rank
within the school each student gets and the rank nationwide in the twelfth grade.
Thus, the misplacement variable is bounded between minus one and one. Students
with larger differences between the tenth and the twelfth grade ranks would have
a large change in their relative performance. The misplacement variable takes the
value zero for students where their twelfth grade rank happens to correspond exactly
to the tenth grade rank. But it can also take positive (negative) values if the student
achieves a better (worse) relative performance in the tenth grade relative to the
twelfth.
In order to examine if feedback provision affects someone’s decision to retake




itsdγ + δMisplacementitsdFeedbackt + βFeedbackt
+ωMisplacementitsd + ζZtd + ξs + ωt + itsd
The decision to retake the national exam one year after graduation depends
also on the opportunity cost of the student. Thus, we control for the unemployment
rate in each year t and district d of student’s residence.
Using Linear Probability (LPM), Probit and Logit models we find that when
feedback is provided, students with higher misplacement are more likely to repeat
the national exams one year after graduation. In Table 2.11, we interact dummies
that capture the magnitude of misplacement with the feedback dummy and we
observe that students in the top misplacement quintile (5) are more likely to resit
the national exams when feedback is provided. The Top Misplacement Quintile (5)
is the most positive one and contains students who get a better rank in the tenth
grade compared to the twelfth. In the feedback years, these are the low achieving
27 The number of students retaking the exam is calculated using the Ministry of Education
dataset. The data about the labour force capacity are collected from the National Statistical
Authority.
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students. In other words, low (high) achieving students are more (less) likely to
resit the national exams when feedback is provided.
Having a particular placement in university admission affects the employment
and earnings prospects of an individual. We examine if feedback influences the
matching of students to University Departments. We first rank all programs 28
according to their average cut-off over the seven years. Each program’s cut-off
expresses the society’s valuation for this particular university department. Highly
demanded programs exhibit high cut-offs. Students apply to programs based on
preferences, social status and expected earnings. There are 659 programs in total.
We estimate the effect of feedback on the difference in the popularity position and
rank of the program admitted conditional on tenth grade performance. Figure 2.17
presents the treatment effect line for the popularity position (on the left) and rank
of the program (on the right) admitted. The provision of feedback has a positive
effect on the popularity position and rank of the program admitted in the upper
half of the prior performance distribution and negative effect on the low half. In
particular, high achieving students move up the University popularity ladder by 30
positions which is 0.15 of a standard deviation. Different placements in university
admission induce different gains related to the returns to college.
We then use the 2003 Labour Force Survey to map each college major into the
most related occupation and then into the expected annual earnings after graduation
(in Euro).29 In Figure 2.18, we present the effect of feedback on the expected annual
earnings, conditional on the tenth grade performance. For students above the 50th
percentile, there is an increase in their annual expected earnings by 250 Euros per
year, which is equivalent to 0.17 standard deviation. For students below the 50th
percentile, the decline in their expected annual earnings corresponds to 0.20 standard
deviations.
2.5.4 Social Mobility
In this section, we examine if the provision of feedback changes the relationship
between parental income (proxied by neighborhood income) and post-secondary op-
portunities (indicated by the program the student enrols in). A priori, we might
expect that students coming from more advantaged neighborhoods would have bet-
ter chances of embarking on a better and more-selective program with higher ex-
pected returns than students coming from less-advantaged neighborhoods. Could
the provision of feedback affect this flow of students from high-income families to
28By program we mean each combination of University Department.
29Mean: 12,758 with 1,473 standard deviation.
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high-expected-income programs? Providing relative performance information might
have a different effect on students whose parents have varying levels of income; the
difference in the role feedback plays may be related to other family resources (fi-
nancial support or social networks) or students from different income backgrounds
might value the ranking information differently.
To investigate whether feedback has a differential effect on students from
different income backgrounds, we create quintiles based on the neighborhood income
and the selectiveness of the program admitted to. In Table 2.16 we report for
each quintile of neighborhood income, the percentage of students who enroll into
each quintile of programs by selectiveness, in the feedback and the non-feedback
regime. We then calculate the difference between the feedback and the non-feedback
percentage. In the last row of Table 2.16, we vertically add the percentages of
students who enroll in any program for each quintile of neighborhood income, to find
the total difference of enrolled students between the feedback and the non-feedback
period. In the last column of Table 2.16, we horizontally add the percentages of
students who enroll in each quintile of programs. We do that to examine if feedback
provision affects the total percentage of students who enroll in higher education. We
find that 2.2 % more students (83.7% Vs 81.5%) enroll in a program in the feedback
regime.
In Table 2.16, we find descriptive evidence that more students coming from
the lowest-income neighborhoods (Quintile1) enroll in any program when feedback
is provided (2.2% more students). A possible explanation is that low achieving stu-
dents discover that if they do not exert more effort they will not be admitted to any
program in tertiary education. Or they might discover that they are not worse than
the low achieving students from high income neighborhoods and that they still have
a chance to enroll in university. So, they might decide to exert more effort. This may
show that feedback benefits students from low-income neighborhoods by reducing
social inequalities and possibly future income inequalities. On the other hand, high
achieving students from low-income neighborhoods discover in the eleventh grade
that they are highly ranked on a national scale and they might react by exerting
more effort.
We also find descriptive evidence in Table 2.16, that feedback provision alters
the parental income (proxied by the neighborhood income) composition of students
who are admitted into the top-ranked programs (Quintile 5). More students from
low income neighborhoods are admitted to the most-selective programs that provide
students with the highest expected earnings after graduation (such as engineering
and law), when feedback information is provided (2.9% Vs 2.6 %). This implies that
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providing relative performance information encourages social elevation and improves
economic opportunity for these students.
It is crucial from a policy perspective to understand if providing feedback is
beneficial for the society as a whole. On one hand, high performing students are
usually the ones responsible for innovation and technological breakthroughs. The
technological diffusion is beneficial for the society as a whole, because technological
innovation is one of the driving forces behind a country’s economic prosperity and
productivity advance (Nickell and Van Reenen [2001]). On the other hand, our study
shows that providing relative performance information improves the performance of
high-achieving students whereas low-achieving students perform even worse. This
widening of the performance gap caused by feedback may be translated into a wage
gap later. We find evidence to this direction using students expected wages. This
might be detrimental especially for low achieving students. An economist may
be fond of the efficiency achieved though information provision as high achieving
students end up higher in the society and the spillover effects of the technological
advances to the whole society. Nevertheless, at the end of the day its up to the
society to decide whether efficiency can be traded for equality.
Additionally, our descriptive statistics evidence show that providing the rel-
ative performance information may encourage students from low income families to
enroll in university and especially to more selective programs. From this perspec-
tive, providing the relative performance information encourages social elevation for
students coming from low income neighborhoods. Thus, feedback decreases the per-
formance or income inequality between students coming from low and high income
neighborhoods.
2.5.5 Positive Vs Negative Surprise
In this section, we examine whether students respond to the specific type of feedback
that they get. Students might not only compare themselves with their class or
school or cohort-mates but they may also compare their own relative performance
in different periods in time. Exploiting within school variation in the 134 senior high
schools and the fact that we know the whole distribution of scores, we restrict this
part of the analysis into the feedback years. If a student receives information that he
is in a higher (lower) decile in the eleventh grade than in the tenth grade, then our
student receives a positive (negative) shock, that can be translated into a ”positive
(negative) surprise”. Intuitively, students who receive a positive (negative) surprise
in the eleventh grade might increase (decrease) their expectations of themselves and
exert more (less) effort in the twelfth grade. In order to examine potential effects
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coming from the surprise they experience in the eleventh grade, we graph the effect
on the twelfth grade rank for each combination of percentile ranks in the tenth grade
and eleventh grade. That is shown by the hitplot in Figure 2.19.
The horizontal axis represent the eleventh grade percentile rank of students
and the vertical axis represent the tenth grade percentile rank. Different colours
express different magnitudes of the treatment effects on the twelfth grade rank. The
diagonal starting from zero towards the right upper edge of the box, represents the
case of ”no value feedback” or in other words those students with their eleventh
grade percentile rank equal to the tenth grade percentile rank. The treatment effect
is positive (negative) for most students experiencing a positive (negative) surprise.
A concern here is that students might not be aware of their tenth grade per-
centile rank, especially if they attend a school with more than one classes. However,
the analysis here is done for deciles of performance and not for percentiles, allowing
students to have priors that do not accurately express their exact tenth grade rank.
2.5.6 Alternative Mechanism: School quality revelation
An alternative mechanism could be that students use the information obtained by
the publication of their scores in such a way that they realise the quality of their
senior high school 30 Students who take the eleventh grade national exams suddenly
realise their school rank and their national rank and the comparison of the two
ranks reveals information about the quality of the school. If a student realises that
his national rank is greater than the school rank then his school is of good quality.
The opposite if the national rank is lower than the school rank. The realisation of
the school quality in the eleventh grade might affect students’ choice of effort in
the twelfth grade. Thus, we exploit the across schools variation in their quality to
identify the effect of feedback on students’ rank nationwide.
In Figure 2.20, we produce the treatment lines separately for students who
realise that the school they attend is worse (on the left) and better (on the right) than
the average quality school. We find the effect of providing the relative performance
information on these students’ standardised national exam score. 31 The average
effect for students who realise that they attend a worse than average quality school
is negative whereas it is positive for those who realise that they attend a better than
average quality school.
30We measure school quality based on the schools’ average national exam performance in the
twelfth grade from 2003 to 2009. Then we construct a rank measure for school quality that varies
from zero to one. The average quality of the schools in our sample is 0.52 (sd 0.21, Min 0.018 and
Max 0.985) which means that our school sample is of a representative quality.
31 Standardised within each year with zero mean and a standard deviation of one.
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Starting with the bottom of the prior performance distribution, we observe
that low achieving students in good schools do better that those in lower quality
schools. Surprisingly, there is a huge increase in the national rank for the top stu-
dents in the worse schools and this increase even offsets the increase in the national
rank of the top students in good schools. We acknowledge two possible explanations
here: First, the better students in the worse schools take the eleventh grade na-
tional exams, they receive feedback, they realise that they are actually exceptional
in a national scale and thus decide to exert more effort in the next time period. So
feedback acts as a motivation boost for these students.
Second, the realisation of their national rank act as a rude awakening for these
students who might initially have a wrong perception about the national competition
and about their school’s quality. These students might be the top students in their
class or school but they now learn that they are left behind. In the next time period,
they exert more effort in order to catch up with the national competition.
The fact that the two curves do not follow the same pattern enhances the
argument that the results are not driven by experience or practice resulted from
sitting the eleventh grade national exam. If students realise the quality of the high
school through the eleventh grade national exams, then would all receive the same
information and they would not react so differently.
2.5.7 Alternative Mechanism: Practice
It could be argued that students can accurately place themselves within their class,
even if they are not explicitly informed about their within-class rank. This is likely
to occur due to repeated interactions among classmates throughout high school.
However, here students receive new information about their relative performance in
reference groups broader than the class. Consider the within school rank: students
receive information about how well they did within their school. In Figure 2.21, we
report the treatment lines for students in schools of different capacity in the eleventh
grade. We make four broad categorisations. First, we consider schools with only
one class where it is likely that students already know their relative standing and
the social comparison information has no extra value (Panel A). Nevertheless, in
a school with only two classes students might know their relative performance in
their class but not in the whole school. Thus, we see that there is a small positive
feedback effect on students who are above the 40th percentile and a small negative
effect on those below it (Panel B). Additionally, the treatment lines become steeper
when we consider schools with three classes (Panel C). In this case, the information
is much broader than that which students can collect from interaction with their
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classmates. This is even more pronounced when we look at students in schools
with more than three classes (Panel D). Summary statistics about the capacity of
schools in our sample are presented in Table 6. Figure 2.21 shows that the effect
of feedback depends on whether the additional information is actually informative
about someone’s relative performance.
That could allay the concern that the eleventh grade national exam might
provide students with experience or training instead of information about their
relative performance. School exams in the eleventh grade have the same format
as national exams in the eleventh grade and the past papers are available in both
regimes. Students practice on past questions and are aware of the structure and
the types of questions in both cases. The structure of the exam paper is the same
from one year to another for all years included in our sample. If students were
experienced from sitting the eleventh grade national exams, then the experience or
training effect would not vary by the size of the school. In other words, if that
was the mechanism then students in small schools would have no reason to react
differently than students in regular schools.
2.5.8 Alternative Mechanism : Parental investment
Another possible mechanism is that parents decide to invest more or less in stu-
dents based on the eleventh grade results. Parents may start devoting more time
helping the child with the homework or they may invest in external support (such
as supplementary material/books, private tutors etc). It is true that there might
be variation in family income within the school and the neighborhood income rep-
resents the average income in each region. We observe considerable differences in
neighborhood income.32
In Figure 2.22, we draw the treatment lines for the bottom and the top
quintile of neighbordhood income. We run specification (2b) separately for the top
and the bottom quintiles of neighborhood income. This may not fully reflect the
family income but we examine the effects of feedback across regions by average
reported income. A wealthy family may have the financial resources to invest in
the child and thus the student may improve his performance in the subsequent year
exam. On the other hand, families from low income neighborhoods may not be
able to pay enough to further support the student. In Figure 2.22 (right panel),
we observe that disclosing rankings increases the average subsequent national rank
for students coming from the highest-income neighborhoods. The average effect on
the subsequent national rank for students from the lowest-income neighborhoods
32mean: 23,517 standard deviation: 8,609 min.:13,005 max.: 66,521
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is negative. In high-income neighborhoods the positive effects of feedback hold for
students above the 40th percentile while only students above the 60th percentile
from low income neighborhoods benefit from feedback. If parental investment was
the only driver of the findings, then we would expect students from highest-income
neighborhoods to improve at all parts of the prior-performance distribution. That
implies that there might be, to some extent, differential parental investment in
students by family income (proxied by neighborhood income) but that cannot fully
generate our results.
2.6 Threats to Identification
2.6.1 Attrition
In our attempt to evaluate the impact of feedback on different performance groups,
the problem of attrition cannot be ignored. If attrition is random and affects different
performance groups in a similar way in both regimes, then the estimates remain
unbiased. Differential attrition here could arise because students from the lowest
percentiles are more likely to drop out from school in comparison to students from
the highest percentiles when they realise their relative ability performance. If that
is stable over time, it will not affect our feedback estimates. What could bias our
estimates, is if differential attrition follows the abolition of feedback. 33 In Table
2.11 we report the drop out rate between tenth and eleventh grade as well the drop
out rate as eleventh and twelfth grades. We also report the percentage of students
who transfer to a school in the eleventh (column 2) and twelfth grade ( column 4).
We observe that there are no significant changes in the percentages of students who
dropped out or transfer to another school before or after feedback was abolished.
Exploiting within school variation, we use the following specification to check
for differential that changes with feedback:
Drop− out12−10isc = α+βquintileFeedbackc ∗Quintiles10isc +λquintileQuintiles10isc
+ψFeedbackc +X
′γ + θc + ϕs + isc
Table 2.13 reports OLS results. The drop out rate is larger for the lowest
quintile than any other compared to the third quintile when feedback is provided.
But more importantly, none of the coefficients of interest are statistically significant.
33 The first affected cohort for which feedback is abolished is the cohort that was in the twelfth
grade in 2006. Thus, this cohort was in the tenth grade in 2004. This is the first cohort that did
not sit national exams in the eleventh grade.
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This implies that there is differential attrition, but it does not vary with feedback
policies.
2.6.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we construct a robustness exercise to complement our main analysis.
One concern is that the change in the variation of performance over time might not
be caused by the provision of feedback. In other words, we need to rule out the
possibility that the better students become worse over time and the worse students
become better over time for reasons different than the provision of feedback.
Exploiting the within school variation, we run specification (2b) but without
pooling feedback and non-feedback years together. Instead, we just compare every
pair of consecutive years in the sample. The only pair of years that we expect to
find a differential response of cohorts is 2005-2006 (the year of the reform). For
every other pair of years, we expect to find similar cohort behaviour. We present
the placebo treatment lines in Figure 2.23. Panel A compares the cohort 2003 to the
2004, as if feedback was abolished in 2004. We find no evidence that other factors
might affect students differently in other years. Panel C corresponds to the actual
reform and we observe that the treatment effects are negative for all percentiles
below the 50th percentile and positive above it. Regarding any policy anticipation
effects, the reform was announced in around December of 2003-2004. We find very
small treatment effects in Panel D, which is the first non-treated cohort. Students
in the first non-treated cohort might observe how last year’s peers of similar tenth
grade performance did and use this information to adjust their effort. Again after
2007, the curve is almost flat throughout the ability distribution.
We conduct some other placebo exercises to verify that the effect does not
depend on the numbers of subjects examined. In Figure 2.24, we draw the treatment
lines for each subject separately. In Table 2.14, we calculate the final-year rank based
on different subjects. In column (1) we find the effect of feedback on the final year
rank that takes into account the Electives or Track subjects on the top of the core
education subjects34 and the results are very similar to those reported so far. In
column (2) we take into account the effect of feedback on students’ performance
in Modern Greek which is a common subject in both regimes and takes a special
weight in the calculation of the University admission grade. Notice, that in the
non-feedback regime two subjects are examined nationally and three within the
school. In column (3) we calculate the last year’s rank based on the five subjects
34Students sit national exams in four Elective subjects. So the overall rank in calculated based
on nine subjects.
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in the feedback regime and the two subjects in the non-feedback regime. Results
remain very similar. Treatment effect remain positive (negative) for the high (low)
achieving students.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the effects of providing relative performance information
on students’ short and long term outcomes. I exploit a large scale natural experi-
ment that took place in Greece and thus we conducted a large scale primary data
collection process. Using detailed data on students’ performance throughout senior
high school and school quality data, I examine the effects of receiving information
about someone’s national and school relative performance. It is human nature to
make comparisons, which can affect students’ beliefs about own ability and effort
decisions. For students above (below) the 50th percentile, I found that feedback
information has a positive (negative) effect on their subsequent performance, popu-
larity of program admitted and expected annual earnings.
The actual reform in this chapter was the abolition of the relative perfor-
mance information that was provided in the eleventh grade. I believe that the
introduction of feedback would have the same effects as we find here. I think that
these effects are driven by the relationship between effort and ability (the production
function). In this setup, effort and ability seem to be complements in the produc-
tion function. This means that high achieving students will get encouraged when
their relative ability becomes known and they will exert more effort. Low achieving
students will exert a lower effort when the information is provided due to discourage-
ment effects. In a different setup, where ability and efforts are substitutes the effects
would go to the opposite direction. For example, if students want to reach a specific
performance threshold then high achieving students would have to smooth effort
across the two grades or maybe even reduce the level of effort exerted in the twelfth
grade. This entirely depends on the relationship between performance threshold
and ability. If feedback is not the main mechanism then it is hard to predict what
would happen if feedback was introduced (instead of abolished). However, in this
study we find evidence that feedback is our main mechanism that drive the results.
Our estimates are at the lower end of those compared to the literature on
improving school inputs. Nonetheless, all the interventions studied so far (improving
teachers quality, reducing class size, enhancing the peer quality group) are signifi-
cantly more costly than the provision of feedback. Releasing feedback information
is a low cost instrument by which to raise students achievement in University ad-
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mission exams.
I outlined two potential mechanisms in this study for why students would
react to the provision of feedback. The first one supports that with feedback, stu-
dents update their belief about their own relative ability and that determines the
next period’s effort choice, as explained in the theoretical model. Another possible
mechanism is that students combine the country and school level information about
their ranks that reveals new information about their school quality. Knowing the
school quality might provide information to students about the level of the com-
petition over restricted university places. I use these mechanisms to explain our
results.
These findings have important policy implications both in relative and abso-
lute terms.
First, the effects of feedback are positive on the high achieving students and
negative on the low achieving students implying that policy makers need to be
cautious depending on who they target. These effects concern students’ next year
performance but also long term outcomes. Feedback provision affects the matching
with the university department students are admitted to and consequently their life
term earnings. Secondly, girls are more sensitive to feedback and they respond more
at both tails of the ability distribution. The relative nature of the above mentioned
results restrict the broad implementation of feedback, but makes it very important
in a competitive process. Our analysis highlights the importance of rank position
on students’ scholastic and labour market outcomes and we believe that the rank
could be a new factor in the education production function.
The analysis moves on highlighting the absolute effects of feedback: First,
high achieving students in worse schools gain a lot from feedback. Second, the con-
sequence of no feedback is more resitting for high achieving students. This is an
important loss of human capital for the society given that the most able students
stay out of the university and/or the labour market. Third, I find evidence that feed-
back encourages students from low-income neighbourhoods. More precisely, more
students from low-income regions gain admission to top University Departments
when feedback is provided, indicating a potential future drop in income inequality.
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Figure 2.3: Announcement of school results
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Figure 2.4: Announcement of school results-Zoom in
Note: This is the format of the publicly announced results. In particular, publicly announced
are the following: a random code, a unique code, a student’s surname, a student’s first name,
the father’s name, the score given by the first examiner, the score given by the second
examiner, the score given by the third examiner-if necessary- and the final score. The final
score is the average of the score given by the first and second examiners. Students are sorted
by alphabetical order. If the difference between the score given by the first and the second
examiner is greater than or equal to 13, then a third examiner is required. The scores given
by the first, second and third-if necessary- examiners are from 0 to 100 while the final score
ranges from 0 to 20. If a third examiner is required, then the final score is the average
between the two highest scores given by any examiners.
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Figure 2.5: Fitted values
Note: Feedback regime refers to years from 2003 to 2005 while non-feedback regime refers to
years 2006-2009. The rank in the twelfth grade is calculated based on the five incentivized
subjects while the rank in the tenth grade is based on the tenth grade GPA.
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Figure 2.6: Time trends for twelfth grade rank nationwide
Note: Feedback provision for cohorts 2003-2005.The 2006 cohort is the first one for which
feedback is abolished. Outcome variable: The national rank in twelfth grade. The trends
correspond to different performance groups based on the tenth grade performance.
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Figure 2.7: Time trends for twelfth grade rank within the school
Note: Feedback provision for cohorts 2003-2005.The 2006 cohort is the first one for which
feedback is abolished. Outcome variable: The rank in twelfth grade within the school. The
trends correspond to different performance groups based on the tenth grade performance.
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Figure 2.8: Treatment effects on the rank nationwide conditional on prior perfor-
mance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the national rank in the twelfth grade at each
decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated 95 % confidence
interval. The national rank is calculated based on the five core educational subjects (in-
centivized). The regressions are conditional on the students’ characteristics: gender, age, a
dummy that takes the value of one if the student is early enrolled in school and dummies
for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are clustered at the
school level.
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Figure 2.9: Treatment effects on the rank within the school in incentivized subjects
conditional on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the school rank in the twelfth grade at each decile
of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated 95 % confidence interval.
The school rank is calculated based on the five core educational subjects that students take
in the twelfth grade and determine the University admission grade (incentivized subjects).
The regressions are conditional on the students’ characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that
takes the value of one if the student is early enrolled in school and dummies for the track
each student chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.10: Treatment effects on the rank within the school in non-incentivized
subjects conditional on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the school rank in the school exams at each decile
of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated 95 % confidence inter-
val. The school rank in the school exams is calculated based on the three non-incentivised
subjects that all students take in the twelfth grade and these subjects are not taken into
account in the calculation of the University admission grade. Students never receive social
comparison information in these subjects. The regressions are conditional on the students’
characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of one if the student is early
enrolled in school and dummies for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.11: Treatment effects on the standardised score conditional on prior per-
formance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the standardised score in the twelfth grade at each
decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated 95 % confidence
interval. The standardised score is calculated based on the five core educational subjects
(incentivized). The standardised score has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one
in each year. The regressions are conditional on the students’ characteristics: gender, age,
a dummy that takes the value of one if the student is early enrolled in school and dummies
for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are clustered at the
school level.
47
Figure 2.12: Treatment effects on the rank within the school conditional on prior
performance for schools of different capacity
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the school rank in the twelfth grade by capacity
of school at each decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated
95 % confidence interval. The regressions are conditional on the students’ characteristics:
gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of one if the student is early enrolled in school
and dummies for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level.
48
Figure 2.13: Treatment effects on the rank within the school by gender conditional
on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the school rank in the twelfth grade by gender
at each decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated 95 %
confidence interval. Males are depicted on the left and Females on the right. The school
rank is calculated based on the five core educational subjects (incentivised). The regressions
are conditional on the students’ characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that takes the value
of one if the student is early enrolled in school and dummies for the track each student
chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.14: Treatment effects on the rank nationwide by school quality conditional
on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the national rank in the twelfth grade by quality
of school at each decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated
95 % confidence interval. The effect of feedback on students’ national rank when they realise
they are in schools worse than the average quality school (on the left) and better than the
average quality schools (on the right). The national rank is calculated based on the five
core educational subjects (incentivised). The regressions are conditional on the students’
characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of one if the student is early
enrolled in school and dummies for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.15: Treatment effects on the standardised score by school quality condi-
tional on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the standardised score in the twelfth grade by
quality of school at each decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the
associated 95 % confidence interval. The effect of feedback on students’ standardised score
when they realise they are in schools worse than the average quality school (on the left) and
better than the average quality schools (on the right). The standardised score is calculated
based on the five core educational subjects (incentivized). The standardised score has a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each year. The regressions are conditional
on the students’ characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of one if the
student is early enrolled in school and dummies for the track each student chooses in the
twelfth grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.16: Treatment effects on the rank nationwide by school quality
conditional on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the national rank in the twelfth grade by
track/specialisation at each decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and
the associated 95 % confidence interval. Three tracks are available in all schools: Classics,
Science and Information Technology. The regressions are conditional on the students’ char-
acteristics: gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of one if the student is early enrolled
in school and dummies for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard
errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.17: Treatment effects on the popularity position and rank of the program
admitted conditional on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the popularity position (on the left) and rank(on
the right) of the program admitted and the associated 95 % confidence interval. There are
672 programs in total. Popularity position and rank measured by the average University
Department cut-off score over seven years. The regressions are conditional on the students’
characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of one if the student is early
enrolled in school and dummies for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.18: Treatment effects on the annual expected earnings conditional on prior
performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the expected annual wage at each decile of stu-
dents’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated 95 % confidence interval.
The annual expected earnings are calculated based on the actual annual earnings of older
graduates who studied the same college field. The regressions are conditional on the stu-
dents’ characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of one if the student is
early enrolled in school and dummies for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.19: Positive and Negative Surprise
Note: Treatment effect for students with positive or negative surprise. Student performance
(in deciles) in tenth grade on the vertical axis and student performance in eleventh grade
(in deciles) on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2.20: Treatment effects on the standardised score by school quality condi-
tional on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the standardised score in the twelfth grade by
quality of school at each decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the
associated 95 % confidence interval. The effect of feedback on students’ standardised score
when they discover they attend a school that is worse than the average quality school (on
the left) and better than the average quality schools (on the right). The standardised score
is calculated based on the five core-education subjects (incentivized). The standardised
score has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each year. The regressions are
conditional on the students’ characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of
one if the student is early enrolled in school and dummies for the track each student chooses
in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
56
Figure 2.21: Treatment effects on the rank within the school conditional on prior
performance for different school cohorts’ size
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the school rank in the twelfth grade by capacity
of school at each decile of students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated
95 % confidence interval. The regressions are conditional on the students’ characteristics:
gender, age, a dummy that takes the value of one if the student is early enrolled in school
and dummies for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.22: Treatment effects on twelfth grade national rank for the bottom and
top quintiles of neighborhood income
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the national rank in the twelfth grade for the
bottom (on the left) and top (on the right) quintiles of neighborhood income at each decile of
students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated 95 % confidence interval.
The national rank is calculated based on the five core-education subjects (incentivized).
The regressions are conditional on the students’ characteristics: gender, age, a dummy that
takes the value of one if the student is early enrolled in school and dummies for the track
each student chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 2.23: Robustness checks
Note: Robustness checks: As if feedback was abolished in 2004 (Panel A), 2005 (Panel B),
2006 (Panel C), 2007 (Panel D), 2008 (Panel E) and 2009 (Panel F).
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Figure 2.24: Feedback effects on twelfth grade rank nationwide for each subject
separately conditional on prior performance
Note: The estimated effect of feedback on the twelfth garde rank nationwide at each decile of
students’ GPA performance in the tenth grade and the associated 95 % confidence interval.
The regressions are conditional on the students’ characteristics: gender, age, a dummy
that takes the value of one if the student is early enrolled in school , school fixed effects
and dummies for the track each student chooses in the twelfth grade. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level.
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2.9 List of Tables
61
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Student Characteristics
Age 17.875 0.466 17 27
Early enrolment 0.167 0.373 0 1
Female 0.566 0.496 0 1
School cohort size 78.518 31.17 10 170
School GPA 85.930 10.186 49.44 100
National exam grade 62.843 19.362 7.550 98.857
Cohort size 63,186 8,710 50,061 71,796
logIncome(in 2009 Euro) 9.999 0.270 9.473 11.105
Retake the national exam 0.115 0.319 0 1
Specialty Characteristics
Specialty:Classics 0.359 0.48 0 1
Specialty:Exact Sciences 0.164 0.371 0 1
Specialty:Information Technology 0.477 0.499 0 1
School Characteristics
Private School 0.039 0.193 0 1
Experimental School 0.061 0.24 0 1
Public School 0.9 0.3 0 1
Urban 0.973 0.161 0 1
University Admission
Admitted 0.823 0.381 0 1
College district different 0.677 0.468 0 1
from school district
Number of university departments 8.293 10.543 1 242
Rank of admitted college 24.699 21.618 1 254
in preference list
Places in tertiary education 60,960 6,268 52,450 68,136
Note: 45.842 obs. 7 cohorts. The variable ”places in tertiary education” is calcu-
lated as the average across admitted students.
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Table 2.2: Sample and Population
134schools 1189schools Difference
Variable Mean Mean (b/s.e.)
Age 17.875 17.892 -0.017***
(0.003)
Early enrolment 0.167 0.167 -0.0004
(0.002)
Female 0.566 0.565 0.002
(0.003)
School cohort size 78.518 75.358 3.160
(0.197)
logIncome (in 2009Euro, annual) 9.999 9.938 0.060***
(0.001)
Retake 0.115 0.112 0.003
(0.002)
Specialty: Classics 0.359 0.366 -0.007
(0.004)
Specialty: Exact Sciences 0.164 0.159 0.005
(0.002)*
Specialty: Information Techno- 0.477 0.475 0.002
logy (0.003)
School and University Charac-
teristics
Private school 0.039 0.080 -0.041***
(0.001)
Public schools 0.900 0.901 -0.001
(0.002)
Experimental school 0.061 0.019 0.042***
(0.001)
Urban 0.973 0.892 0.082***
(0.002)
Admitted 0.823 0.803 0.020***
(0.001)
Internal migration 0.677 0.800 -0.123***
(0.002)
Rank of admitted college in 8.293 8.584 -0.292***
preference list (0.065)
No of university departments in 24.699 26.865 -2.166***
preference list (0.120)
Note: 45,842 obs. in sample and 431,469 obs. in population. There are in total
1,323 senior high schools in operation. Evening schools are excluded from the
sample and the population
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Table 2.3: Treatment and Control Group
Feedback No Feedback Difference
Variable Mean Mean (b/s.e.)
Student and Speciality Charac-
teristics
Age 17.835 17.909 0.074***
(0.004)
Early enrolment 0.209 0.129 -0.080***
(0.004)
Female 0.553 0.579 0.026***
(0.005)
School cohort size 88.083 70.030 18.053***
(0.288)
logIncome (in 2009Euro,annual) 9.988 10.005 0.017***
(0.003)
Retake 0.104 0.124 0.020***
(0.003)
Specialty: Classics 0.344 0.377 0.033***
(0.004)
Specialty: Exact Sciences 0.176 0.154 -0.022***
(0.004)
Specialty: Information Techno- 0.480 0.469 -0.011**
logy (0.005)
School and University Charac-
teristics
Private school 0.037 0.037 0.0003
(0.002)
Public schools 0.905 0.897 -0.008
(0.005)
Experimental school 0.058 0.066 0.007
(0.005)
Urban 0.972 0.974 0.002
(0.002)
Admitted 0.836 0.814 -0.022***
(0.004)
Internal migration 0.475 0.635 -0.160***
(0.002)
Rank of admitted college in 9.657 7.068 -2.589***
preference list (0.115)
No of university departments in 26.946 22.724 -2.589***
preference list (0.011)
Note: 21.965 obs. in treatment group and 23.781 obs. in control group. The
feedback period is the pooled period from 2003 to 2005 while the non-feedback
period consists of the pooled period from 2006 to 2009.
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Table 2.4: Estimation results: Rank nationwide
Dependent Variable: Rank nationwide in incentivized subjects
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Feedback*quintile5 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Feedback*quintile4 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Feedback*quintile2 -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.038***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Feedback*quintile1 -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.079***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Feedback 0.009*** 0.009 -0.001
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
quintile5 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.251***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
quintile4 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.102***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
quintile2 -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.093***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
quintile1 -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.192***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Specialty: Science 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.048***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)










Year FE. no no yes
School FE. no yes yes
Observations 45,746 45,746 45,746
R squared 0.635 0.666 0.675
No of schools 134 134 134
Note: A constant is also included. Clusters at school level.
*,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level re-
spectively.
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Table 2.5: Rank within the school in incentivized and non-incentivized sub-
ject
Dependent Variable: School Rank in incentivized and non-incentivized subjects
Incentivized subjects Non-Incentiv. subjects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Feedback*quintile5 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Feedback*quintile4 0.040*** 0.040*** -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Feedback*quintile2 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Feedback*quintile1 -0.079*** -0.079*** 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Feedback 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
quintile5 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.256*** 0.256***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
quintile4 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.105***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
quintile2 -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.095***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
quintile1 -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.200*** -0.200***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Female -0.009*** -0.011*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Specialty: Science 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Specialty: Classics -0.019*** -0.021*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Log Income 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.007 0.007
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Experimental school -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Private school -0.003 -0.004 0.030 0.032
(0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.018)
Urban -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year FE. no yes no yes
Observations 45.746 45.746 45.746 45.746
R squared 0.674 0.675 0.542 0.543
No of schools 134 134 134 134
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school level. A constant is also
included. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 2.6: Estimation results : Differential Response by Gender
Dependent Variable: Rank in twelfth grade
Rank within the school Rank nationwide
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female*Feedback -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Female 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.052
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Feedback 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.008
(0.003)*** (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Speciality in Science 0.198 0.199 0.198 0.196
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Speciality in Classics -0.040 -0.039 -0.039 -0.040
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)***
Income -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
Private -0.015 -0.015 0.134 0.134
(0.008)* (0.008)* (0.016)*** (0.017)***
Experimental -0.015 -0.015 0.017 0.017
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.018) (0.018)
urban -0.029 -0.029 0.007 0.007
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.015) (0.015)
R2 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16
N 45,746 45,746 45,746 45,746
Year FE X X
No of schools 134 134 134 134
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school level. A constant is also
included. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
The rank in the twelfth grade here takes into account only the incentivized
subjects. It is calculated within the school for columns (1) and (2) and across
schools in columns (3) and (4)
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Table 2.7: Capacity of schools
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Schools with one class
Public 0.899 0.302 0 1
Private 0.101 0.301 0 1
Experimental 0 0 0 0
Urban 0.378 0.485 0 1
Class size 18.130 5.717 10 29
No of schools 14
No of students 522
Schools with two classes
Public 0.932 0.252 0 1
Private 0 0 0 0
Experimental 0.068 0.252 0 1
Urban 0.378 0.485 0 1
Class size 16.000 4.739 10 27
No of schools 38
No of students 3,709
Schools with three classes
Public 0.941 0.235 0 1
Private 0.053 0.223 0 1
Experimental 0.006 0.077 0 1
Urban 0.986 0.115 0 1
Class size 18.211 4.998 10 32
No of schools 63
No of students 9,959
Schools with three classes
Public 0.881 0.324 0 1
Private 0.035 0.184 0 1
Experimental 0.084 0.277 0 1
Urban 1 0 0 1
Class size 20.072 6.973 10 33
No of schools 74
No of students 26,354
Note: 111 senior high schools provided us with the eleventh and twelve grade classroom infor-
mation. The number of classes in a school may not be stable across years. Some schools may
expand and some others may shrink in some years.
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Table 2.8: Loss of human capital in terms of labour force participants










Table 2.9: Decision to Retake and Feedback
Dependent Variable: Repeat the national exams
LPM Probit Logit
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Feedback* Misplacement 0.058 0.059 0.345 0.602
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.092)*** (0.181)***
Feedback 0.012 0.019 0.070 0.131
(0.006)* (0.007)** (0.036)* (0.074)*
Misplacement -0.014 -0.015 -0.071 -0.099
(0.014) (0.015) (0.077) (0.142)
Age -0.014 -0.019 -0.076 -0.157
(0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.039)* (0.062)**
Early Enrolled -0.005 -0.006 -0.011 -0.033
(0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.082)
Female -0.007 -0.007 -0.044 -0.073
(0.003)* (0.004)* (0.020)* (0.038)*
Specialization in Classics -0.020 -0.018 -0.113 -0.200
(0.004)*** (0.007)* (0.024)*** (0.046)***
Specialization in Science 0.013 0.016 0.090 0.169
(0.005)** (0.004)*** (0.026)*** (0.049)***
District Unemployment 0.005 0.002 0.025 0.046
(0.002)** (0.002) (0.012)* (0.019)**
If admitted in first place -0.212 -0.218 -1.041 -1.964
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.035)*** (0.070)***
Internal Migration 0.064 0.072 0.445 0.889









R2 or pseudo-R squared 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
Log likelihood -13,432 -13,439
School FE X X X
Year FE X X X X
N 45,746 45,746 45,746 45,746
Note: A constant is also included. Standard errors are clustered at the
school level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Decision to Retake, Feedback and Misplacement
Dependent Variable: Repeat the national exams
LPM Probit Logit
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Feedback -0.031 -0.002 -0.007 -0.017
(0.007)*** (0.008) (0.047) (0.090)
Feedback* Misplacement Quintile 5 0.045 0.040 0.219 0.412
(0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.050)*** (0.095)***
Feedback* Misplacement Quintile 4 0.023 0.023 0.120 0.231
(0.010)** (0.009)** (0.049)** (0.095)**
Feedback* Misplacement Quintile 2 0.004 0.007 0.049 0.103
(0.010) (0.011) (0.054) (0.101)
Feedback* Misplacement Quintile 1 -0.034 -0.031 -0.151 -0.274
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.052)*** (0.098)***
Misplacement Quintile 5 -0.017 -0.018 -0.103 -0.184
(0.007)** (0.007)** (0.038)*** (0.073)**
Misplacement Quintile 4 -0.025 -0.025 -0.139 -0.262
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.038)*** (0.072)***
Misplacement Quintile 2 0.017 0.016 0.076 0.143
(0.007)** (0.008)** (0.039)* (0.073)**
Misplacement Quintile 1 0.030 0.031 0.148 0.273
(0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.043)*** (0.080)***
Female -0.010 -0.010 -0.056 -0.105
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.020)*** (0.037)***
Age 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.035) (0.067)
Early Enrolled 0.011 0.009 0.047 0.087
(0.008) (0.008) (0.041) (0.078)
Unemployment 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.020
(0.001)*** (0.002) (0.011) (0.021)
Internal migration -0.024 -0.022 -0.109 -0.211
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.038)*** (0.075)***
Specialization in Science -0.007 -0.004 -0.018 -0.036
(0.005) (0.005) (0.025) (0.048)
Specialization in Classics -0.018 -0.017 -0.093 -0.175









R2 or pseudo-R squared 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06
Log likelihood -14,062 -14,063
School FE X X X
Year FE X X X X
N 45,746 45,746 45,746 45,746
Note: A constant is also included. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. * p < 0.1;





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.12: Estimation results : Drop out

























Year FE. no yes
Observations 56.041 56.041
R squared 0.130 0.203
No of schools 134 134
Note: A constant is also included. Clusters at school
level. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and
1% level respectively. Quintiles are constructed based on
the school performance in tenth grade used.
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Table 2.13: Estimation results: Different outcome variables
Dependent Variable: Rank in twelfth grade
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Feedback*quintile5 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.050***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Feedback*quintile4 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Feedback*quintile2 -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Feedback*quintile1 -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.066***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Feedback 0.002 0.008 -0.0004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
quintile5 0.257*** 0.247*** 0.245***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
quintile4 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.107***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
quintile2 -0.097*** -0.100*** -0.091***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
quintile1 -0.207*** -0.231*** -0.210***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Female -0.019*** 0.030*** -0.014 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Early Enrollment 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Specialty: Science 0.006*** 0.019*** * 0.023***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Specialty: Classics 0.010*** 0.098*** -0.059
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 45,746 45,746 45,746
R squared 0.661 0.674 0.625
No of schools 134 134 134
Note: A constant is also included. The outcome in the first column
is the rank calculated based on the five core subjects and the four
Track subjects. The outcome in the second column is the rank
in Modern Greek. The outcome variable in the third column is
calculated based on five subjects in the feedback regime and two
subjects in the non-feedback regime. Standard errors clustered at
the school level. Year fixed effects included. Clusters at school































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the recent years the literature on the role of social interactions in economic be-
havior has expanded rapidly. This doesn’t come as surprise when one thinks the
importance of those effects in every day decision-making. The basis of decision-
making though in almost every context is information. Humans are social beings
and we naturally collect information through social interactions in order to inform
our goals and choices. This is even more pronounced among adolescents. In de-
velopmental science, it has been widely argued that adolescents and young adults
regularly mimic the choices and behavior of role models in their environment (Bell
1970).
Brock and Durlauf 2001 define social interactions as the idea that an individ-
ual’s marginal utility with respect to other individuals’ choices in his reference group
is positive. The desire to conform induces prevalent patterns of behavior even among
agents with heterogeneous tastes over externalities from other individuals’ choices
(Bernheim 1994). Social interactions within a reference group have been shown to
affect students’ achievement. However, there is little evidence on the effect of social
interactions on the decisions of college enrollment and academic mobility. More-
over, social interactions can explain variation in choices across groups with similar
characteristics. For example, Schelling 1973 provide early evidence of social inter-
actions in binary choice in a profusion of contexts such as driving style and athletic
play. Intuitively, conformity causes social interactions to be interconnected with
neighborhood effects. Physical proximity amplifies the interplay of utility spillovers
from other agents’ choices and the combined effect becomes area specific. In an
educational context, Garner and Raudenbush 1991 provide evidence of a positive
relation between neighborhood quality and educational attainment.
There is evidence that peers’ decision affect scholastic performance in ele-
mentary, middle and high school but also during college. Hoxby 2000a examines
the effect of social interaction in grade school and finds that students who were
randomly assigned to classes with students who have high reading scores relative
to the school and grade, received higher reading scores. Hanushek et al. 2003 find
that peer achievement has a positive effect on achievement growth. In particular,
0.1 standard deviation increase in peer average achievement leads to a 0.02 increase
in student’s performance. Zimmerman 2003b examines the effect of social interac-
tion using freshmens’ SAT score. He finds strong positive social interaction effects
among roommates at almost all parts of the ability distribution. Cipollone and
Alfonso 2007 find strong social interactions inter alia the decision to stay longer in
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school. When men were exempted from the compulsory military services -due to
an earthquake- and stayed longer in school, the graduation rates of young women
in the affected areas rose by about 2 percentage points. Fletcher 2006 using sur-
vey data, finds strong evidence of social interactions college preferences and college
enrollment. Giorgi et al. 2007 find that ones’ behavior influences the educational
decision while in college, indicating the importance of social interaction even at a
later stage of someone’s academic life. Sacerdote 2011 examines social interaction
effects at the room and accommodation level where students are randomly assigned.
He does not find any significant influence of peers.
In this paper we examine the effect of social interactions on the decisions of
adolescents and young adults regarding college enrollment and academic mobility.
We use a new dataset from Greece that contains information on exam scores, college
enrollment and educational mobility for every student in six cohorts. We exploit
the particular institutional setting in Greece, in which schools are build very close
to each other. This setting allows for rich variation of school characteristics within
a relatively contained geographical area. We exploit this exogenous variation in
group characteristics over time and space to address the endogenous nature of the
social interaction groups. The social interaction effects are defined as contextual
interactions that induce different mappings from individual characteristics to out-
comes (Bryk and Raudenbush 2001). Reference groups are viewed as ecologies in
which the social backgrounds affect individual choices of otherwise similar agents
(Raudenbush and Sampson 1999).
Similar age peers in one’s vicinity consist a natural reference group that
provide valuable and otherwise costly information, necessary in academic decision
making. We widen the reference group and examine social interactions with re-
spect to a series of reference groups: same-cohort school peers, different-cohort
school peers, same-cohort peers in the neighborhood and different-cohort peers in
the neighborhood.
There are particular advantages in having the universe of high school grad-
uates for a country. First, we can observe the behaviour of all students regarding
their education decisions and not only of some groups of students. Second, we are
able to observe different reference groups. A student may be affected by the deci-
sions of same age or older peers in his school and neighborhood. We contribute to
the literature by comparing the size of the social interaction effects across distance
in space and age.
Empirical analysis of social interactions on students’ decisions has been open
to question because of the difficulties in disentangling these effects from other con-
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founding influences.1. We use an instrumental variable approach and we exploit
spatial and cohort-to-cohort variation to combat potential endogeneity problems
and the well known ”reflection-problem” (Manski 1993, Manski 2000). There are
two sources of potential endogeneity: Self selection into social groups and common
shocks that affect every member of a social group. Reflection may arise from reverse
causality because the outcomes of members in the same groups and their decisions
are simultaneous. In other words, it is difficult to disentangle if one’s actions are
the cause or the effect of his peers’ influence. These challenges are standard in the
social interactions literature. The institutional setting behind our study refrains
students from endogenously select their peers in school, facilitating the validity of
the identification strategy. Moreover, the geographical density of schools allows us
to define social groups wider than a student’s schoolmates. Motivating from the
idea of role modelship, we battle the simultaneity challenge by investigating social
interactions between peers in consecutive cohorts.
By using multiple cohorts and conditioning on school and neighbourhood
fixed effects as well as school-and neighborhood- specific time trends we are able
to control for unobserved time-varying factors that might confound peer effects in
schools and neighbourhoods. We use an instrumental variable approach to combat
endogeneity and reflection. We show that within schools and neighbourhoods, there
is considerable cohort-to-cohort variation in the proportion of female students that
can be attributed to random factors.
We find positive spillover effects between one’s decision to enrol in college
and that of their peers. More specifically, the results found here indicate that
students who attend a high school with a hundred percent more schoolmates who
enrol in college are 12.6 percent more likely to attend college. We also find positive
spillovers regarding the decision of educational mobility. Students are 10.7 percent
more likely to move to a different city to study if their older peers in school do so, a
hundred percent more often. We find that these externalities decrease with the size
of reference group.
The policy implications of social interactions can be indirect. The skills and
resources that characterise a reference group are usually fixed. As a consequence, an
improvement in someone’s group characteristics means an equivalent deterioration
in someone else’s group attributes. Some may argue that the redistribution in favor
of disadvantaged students can act as a boost in their scholastic outcomes, when the
redistribution comes from more advantaged areas where students might depend less
1 The existing literature that deals with identification of the social comparison effects use either
laboratory experiments (Armin and Andrea 2006), natural experiments (Zimmerman 2003b), quasi-
experimental designs (Hoxby 2000a), or fixed effects (Hanushek et al. 2003
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on their peers’ quality. For example, Arcidiacono and Nicholson [2005] suggest that
the existence of social interaction effects supports claims against school vouchers.
This is because, the best students leaving public schools can be detrimental to the
students left behind.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the unique dataset
used and the institutional setting related to college admission. The empirical strat-
egy used to identify social interactions is analysed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 dis-
cuss the validity of the identification strategy. We present and discuss the results
in college enrollment and educational mobility in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Data and Institutional Setting
3.2.1 How are students admitted to college
The transition from high school to post-secondary education in Greece is based
on an unusually systematic and transparent allocation of students to university
departments2 In particular, every high school student who completes the twelfth
grade receives an admission score, which is the only criterion for university admission
and weights: (i) her performance in national twelfth grade exams 3 (ii) her grade
twelve within school performance which is a combined score for homework and
midterm exams in each subject.
After receiving their admission scores, students are required to submit a list
of ranked choices of specific departments in universities that are relevant to their
twelve grade track. For example, students outside the Classics track cannot list
Law schools. Each university department generally offers one major of bachelor
degree and no minor specializations can be declared. Every university department
admits a pre-specified number of students. A computerized system at the Ministry
of Education ranks students by their admission score and assigns the highest ranked
student to her preferred choice. It then moves to the next student and assigns her
2Every tertiary education institute in Greece is public as free education is a constitutional right.
Degrees awarded by private colleges are not recognized by the state.
3The twelfth grade exams are written exams administered nationally only once every year and
last from late May to early June. The exams are proctored and marked externally. Exam markers
do not observe the name, school, or even the city of the student whose paper they grade. Students
usually take six component exams, with a combination of common subjects(Language, Mathematics,
Physics, Biology or History) and four compulsory track-specific subjects and one elective exam.
There are three tracks: Classics, Natural Sciences and Technical Studies. The overall score is the
unweighted average of these scores. Students who fail are allowed to retake the exam the next year.
In addition, students are not allowed to take the national exams early.
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to the first department in her list in which there is an available place, and so and so
forth. In this context, students have incentives to truthfully reveal their preferences.
University departments must enrol the students assigned to them by the
Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education announces the score of the last
admitted student in each university department. The last admitted students in more
prestigious departments have generally higher scores in comparison to those in less
prestigious ones. Once a student admitted they cannot transfer to a different major.
College education is completely publicly funded and every student is exempted for
college fees. Private donations to colleges are against the law.
3.2.2 Data
For the empirical analysis we construct a unique dataset of all students graduating
from high school in Greece from 2003 to 2009. We obtain the information from
various sources:
1. Administrative data from the Hellenic Ministry of Education containing course
taking information and exam grades in the final year, gender, year of birth,
graduation year and college admission information. In addition, the total
number of places in tertiary education in each year is provided.
2. School specific information such as name of school, type of school (private,
public4, experimental5), geographical coordinates and name of preferacture it
belongs to6. There are 1319 high schools in Greece7.
3. The Ministry of Finance provided us with average net income information at
the postcode of the school in 2009 Euro.
4. The Ministry of Internal Affairs provided us with urban density information.
Urban areas are those with more than 20,000 inhabitants.
5. Geographical coordinates for every tertiary education institute in Greece.
There are fifty five college campuses. Not all campuses offer the same ma-
jors.
4Students are assigned to public schools according to a school district system
5Admission to experimental schools is based on a lottery
6There are fifty two preferactures in Greece. Preferactures are classified by the Hellenic National
Statistical Authority
7Of which, 112 are private, and 1207 public. Of those 1207 public schools, 23 are experimental.
There are no private experimental schools in Greece. 74 evening high schools for employed people
of usually older age are excluded from our analysis
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The median distance of a school from each nearest neighbouring school is
0.32 miles.8 We use cluster analysis to define and construct neighborhoods within
a mile from each school. We construct 406 clusters that cover the whole country.
Every cluster is a neighborhood that contains all twelve-grade students who attend
any other high school within a mile (1.06 miles) radius from one’s high school9.
Figures 1 maps all high schools and tertiary education institutes in our dataset.
Our analysis uses information regarding characteristics and choices of older
school peers. Because of this, we use data on student cohorts from 2004 to 200910
Furthermore, our discussion of academic mobility refers to the decisions of students
to move to a different preferacture in order to study, given they were admitted to
some college. Thus, for this part, we focus only on admitted students11. Lastly, we
drop 35,808 obs. for which the group of schoolmates overlapped perfectly with the
social group of their neighborhood. This exclusion allows us to compare spillover
effects from social groups of various sizes. We consolidate our sample by dropping
observations with missing values.
Table 3.1 describes our pooled data across cohorts. Fifty seven percent are
females. Ninety percent of the students reside in urban areas. More than 90 %
of schools are public. Although, mean postcode income among private schools is
significantly higher compared to public schools, mean national exam score doesn’t
seem to differ much. Experimental schools are in more aﬄuent areas in comparison
to other public schools as revealed by their higher mean postcode income. The mean
national exam score of students attending experimental schools is much higher than
the score achieved by students in private or public schools. Each neighbourhood
contains on average 4 schools and 929 student observations.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
We start off by defining one’s reference group as his same-cohort school peers. We
investigate the hypothesis that social or collective behaviour patterns drive individ-
ual preferences because agents derive utility from conformity or provide access to
8Mean of distance from nearest neighbour: 1.85 miles. Standard deviation: 18.37 miles. 25th
percentile:0.07 miles. 75th percentile: 0.77 miles.
9We exploit the fact that many schools were built very close to each other in most urban settings
in Greece. This is more prevalent in Attica, the region surrounding the city of Athens, the capital
of Greece. To give an example, in the cartier of Grava in Athens, there are six high schools next to
each other along with several elementary and middle schools that form a humongous school building
complex. According to the 2001 census, Attica holds around 36 percent of the total population.
10The first cohort in our sample, 2003 (size: 59,102 obs.), is used as a reference group for the
2004 cohort.
11In the academic mobility analysis we exclude 60,356 students who did not enrol in college
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information.
In particular, we investigate whether a student’s decision to enrol in college
depends on the decision of his peers in school by using the following regression:
IfEnrolledi,s,t = α+ γIfEnrolledi−1,s,t + βXi,s,t + κTt + µSs + pisyear + ist(1)
where IfEnrolledi,s,t takes the value one if student i in school s and year t
enrols into college and IfEnrolledi−1,s,t is the fraction of all other students except
of student i in school s and year t, who enrol into college. So, we regress a student’s
i decision to enrol in college on the mean enrollment of his peers in school s in year
t and other controls. Our covariates include a dummy for being female, a student’s
admission score, dummies for chosen track in the senior year of high school, dummies
for the school each student attended, school specific time trends and year dummies.
To control for time-varying unobserved factors that may be correlated with mean
college enrolment we include a full set of school-specific linear time trends.
The main coefficient of interest is γ, which captures how the mean enrollment
of one’s school peers affects his decision to enrol in college. Initially, we employ
ordinary least squares to estimate peer effects in education decisions. There are
at least two sources of potential bias here: (1) endogeneity and (2) the reflection
problem (Manski [1993], Manski [2000]).
Firstly, in many settings individuals self-select themselves into a specific
group of peers that generates endogeneity issues if the variables that are responsible
for this choice are not fully observable. Students who choose to attend the same
high schools might share the same observed and unobserved characteristics. In this
case, if we find a relationship between the observed characteristics and the outcome
variable it might not be causal. This could be coming from the fact that unobserved
characteristics might also affect the outcome variables. This potential unobserved
heterogeneity that drives selection into social groups may bias our estimates. Nev-
ertheless, self selection of students into schools is restricted in our setting because
students are assigned to public schools12 based on geographical criteria and they
cannot choose their school peers endogenously, by construction. Therefore, social
group membership is as good as random, since it does not depend on observables.
Endogeneity may also result from unobserved common group effects, such as
teacher and school quality, that affect every student in a social group and render
the identification of social interactions challenging. We contribute to the literature
1292 % of students in our sample attend public or public experimental schools
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by mitigating the endogeneity challenge that stems from common group shocks. We
take advantage of a special institutional setting with rich spatial and over time varia-
tion in school characteristics. We use cluster analysis to construct geographical units
wider than the school district; namely neighborhoods. Those geographical units are
big enough to allow for school diversity but also compact enough to capture common
behavioral patterns in the area. In particular, we exploit our special institutional
setting to identify same-cohort peers who do not attend the same school. We iden-
tify same-cohort peers who live in 1 mile radius and attend different schools. We
call this group of same-cohort peers who live very close to each other ”neighbours”.
In addition to their same-cohort schoolmates, students are likely to interact with
their same-cohort neighbours and they might also be affected by their decisions. A
students’ neighbours attend different schools and face different school environments.
In each neighbourhood, there are students who attend on average four (4.449) dif-
ferent schools (Table 3.1). The basic idea here is to compare students’ decisions
from consecutive cohorts who have similar characteristics and face the same neigh-
bourhood environment but attend different schools, but one cohort has more female
students than the other. Thus, it becomes feasible to isolate the impact of a peer
group from the impact of each student’s school itself.
Second, reflection may arise because we cannot distinguish whether some-
one’s action is the cause or the effect of his peers’ outcomes. In other words, one’s
decision is simultaneous with that of his peers. We battle the simultaneity challenge
by using as an IV the time lagged gender composition in the school and neighbor-
hood level. So we compare the decisions of students from consecutive cohorts who
had a different fraction of one-cohort-older peers in their school or neighbourhood
who enrolled in college. To build some intuition here, peers one-cohort-older might
provide information to younger peers about the costs and the benefits of attending
college or migrating to another city or they might function as ”role models”.
Estimating equation (1) using OLS will lead to biased results. In order to
address these concerns we propose the proportion of girls in someone’s reference
group in the previous period as a source of variation for mean enrollment in college.
The intuition is that an individual’s academic decision may be related with their
gender, but not the gender composition of their environment. This satisfies the
exclusion restriction for the validity of our instrument.
We control for unobserved characteristics of schools, students and neighbours
that are correlated with the percentage of females and could also be correlated with
students’ performance. We do this by exploiting variation in the gender composition
across consecutive cohorts within the same school and neighbourhood. By using
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multiple cohorts and controlling for school and neighbourhood fixed effects, we take
into account unobserved factors that might invalidate the school and neighbourhood
peer effects analysis.
The first stage regressions are:
IfEnrolledg,t = φ1 + κ1IfFemaleg,t + +β1Xi,g,t + Tt + Sg + pi1gyear + e1,g,t(2)
IfEnrolledg,t−1 = φ2+κ2IfFemaleg,t-1++β2Xi,g,t+Tt+Sg+pi2gyear+e2,g,t−1(3)
g ∈ {{school}, {neighborhood}}
where IfFemalej,t and IfFemalej,t−1 is the proportion of females in geo-
graphical unit g (school and neighborhood) and year t and year t-1 respectively.
The basic idea here is to compare the collective decisions of students (to enrol in
college and migrate to another city to pursue tertiary education) from consecutive
years who have similar characteristics but the percentage of female peers varies from
one year to another. Using the proportion of girls in someone’s last year’s reference
group as an IV relies on the assumption that this proportion has no other effect on
someone’s decision to enrol in college than through its effect on last year’s mean
college enrollment and thus this year’s someone decision to enrol in college.
The second stage regressions are as follows:
IfEnrolledigt = δ1 + κ1IfEnrolled−i,g,t + ψ1Xi,g,t + Tt + Sg + λ1gyear + 1ist(4)
IfEnrolledigt = δ2 + κ2IfEnrolled−i,g,t-1 + ψ2Xi,g,t + Tt + Sg + λ2gyear + 2ist(5)
g ∈ {{school}, {neighborhood}}
Our key identifying assumption requires that changes in the proportion of
female peers within a school and within a neighborhood are not correlated with
changes in unobserved factors that could affect students’ decisions. In particular, it
is required that changes in the proportion of females within schools and neighbour-
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hoods are not associated with changes in student characteristics ie. age, ethnicity
income, parental education. We provide evidence that these changes in the propor-
tion of girls within a school and within a neighbourhood are not correlated with
changes in school enrolment.
Notice that we exploit within school and within neighbourhood variation
from one cohort to another. Our analysis does not look at differences in the per-
centage of females across schools or neighbourhoods. Additionally, we look at the
effect of one’s peers on their decision to enrol in college and migrate to another city.
To do this, we control for one’s performance in the senior year national standardised
exams.
The fact that students are assigned to schools based on distance alleviates
the concern that students respond to these random shocks in gender composition
by switching to another school. Students need to provide adequate evidence of res-
idence in a given region in order to have access to the closest in terms of distance
school. But even if students could switch schools, then it would be very difficult to
choose the destination school based on the percentage of girls in this school for the
following reason: the average percentage of female peers by school or neighbour-
hoods is not publicly known. But even if it was known it would be difficult to know
the percentage of females for a cohort that enters the school in a specific year. Ad-
ditionally, we provide evidence that leaving a school (drop out or transfer) is not be
correlated to the percentage of female students in that school. It is important to note
that any factor affecting the proportion of girls in all geographic units in the same
way, such as a female fertility decline 17 years before, will be captured by year fixed
effects and would thus not invalidate the identification strategy. We include school
or neighbourhood fixed effects to control for school or neighbourhood-invariant un-
observed factors respectively. One could be worried that time-varying factors ie.
better teachers in some years or a new college in the neighbourhood could affect
mean enrolment. To address this concern, we include school- or neighbourhood-
specific time trends to control for time-varying factors that could be correlated with
changes in the fraction of enrolled students in one’s reference group.
Next, we turn to academic mobility. We believe that there might exist social
interaction effects in the decision to migrate. We model a person’s decision to
move to a different city in order to pursue tertiary education, given that they were
admitted to some college. This decision is a function of the average decision in one’s
environment as specified in our regression model:
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IfMigrateigt = α1 + γ1IfMigratej,g,t + β1Xi,g,t + κ1Tt + µ1Ss + φ1gyear+ 1ist(6)
IfMigrateigt = α2+γ2IfMigratej,g,t−1+β2Xi,g,t+κ2Tt+µ2Ss+φ2gyear+2ist(7)
where IfMigrateigt is the decision of student i in geographical unit g and
year t and t-1 respectively to migrate in a different city in order to study, conditional
on being accepted to college. IfMigrate−i,g,t and IfMigratej,g,t−1 are the fractions
of students except of student i who migrated to a different city in order to study
in geographical unit g and year t and t-1 respectively. We include year fixed effects
in order to control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics that could affect
the migration decision. When we exploit the within school cohort-to-cohort change
in the percentage of female students, we include school fixed effects. When we
do the analysis at the neighborhood level, we include neighborhood fixed effects
and we exploit the differences in school characteristics in a given year within each
neighborhood.
We use an instrumental variable approach in order to estimate the effect
of social interaction on the decision of students to move to another city to attend
college. Again gender composition seems a likely candidate for an instrumental vari-
able. The proportion of females in a geographical unit g may create an environment
more conducive to collective migration as exhibited by average patterns of behavior
but it has no direct effect on an individual’s decision to migrate.
The first stage regressions is as follows:
IfMigrateg,t = φ+ κIfFemaleg,t + βXi,g,t + κTt + µSg + eg,t(8)
IfMigrateg,t = φ+ κIfFemaleg,t−1 + βXi,g,t + κTt + µSg + eg,t(9)
g ∈ {{school}, {neighborhood}}
Our main specifications are estimated at the neighborhood level. When
estimated at the geographical units of neighborhood, these specifications address
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both the endogeneity and simultaneity issues.
Potential threats to our analysis may include the following: Actual networks
may be very different from ecologies in one’s vicinity. In addition, social media may
allow for peer effects that are independent of proximity and render our analysis
of spatial social interactions irrelevant. This is less of a fear though as internet
penetration is relatively low in Greece13. Parents, relatives and much older indi-
viduals in a student’s environment may influence his/her academic decisions more
than his/her same-cohort or one year older peers within his school and/or within
his neighborhood .
3.4 Validity of Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy requires that fluctuations in the proportion of female stu-
dents within a school and within a neighborhood should not be correlated with other
cohort-to-cohort changes that could affect students’ education decisions. In partic-
ular, we check if changes in the proportion of female students within a school and
within a neighborhood are correlated with changes in students’ observable charac-
teristics. For the universe of students (N=355,808 students) the only characteristics
we know are: the age of students and if a student enrolled early in school. This is
the case if a student is born in the first quarter of his birth year.
However for a smaller sample of 45 schools (observations=18,670) we also
know the ethnicity of students. In Table 3.4, we present some evidence that the
schools in the smaller sample have no different characteristics compared to the whole
population. We cannot implement the whole analysis based on this smaller sample
because we need the universe of students and schools in order to construct the
neighbourhoods and exploit within neighbourhood variation. We use this smaller
sample of schools to check if changes in the proportion of girls are correlated with
changes in students’ ethnicity and mobility rates.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide evidence on the balancing tests for the whole
sample and the sub-sample of the 45 schools. Table 3.2 reports the estimated coef-
ficients from the OLS regression and a within school regression (school fixed effects)
of students’ characteristics on the proportion of females in each school. We also re-
port the estimated coefficients from a within school regression when school specific
time trends are added (columns (3) and (6)). Table 3.3 reports the estimated coef-
ficients from the within neighbourhood regression (neighborhood fixed effects) with
13This is more understandable when one takes into account that Greece has 227 inhabited islands,
most of which are quite far from the mainland and have outdated telecommunications infrastructure
(Ellinikos Organismos Tourismou (EOT), ”Greek islands”, April 2012).
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(columns (3) and (6)) and without (columns (2) and (4)) adding neighbourhood
linear time trends. Again the OLS estimates are reported as a point of comparison.
As we notice from these two tables, the proportion of females is not related
to most of the students’ characteristics, both in the OLS and the within school/
neighborhood regressions. There are some exceptions in the OLS and within school
regression. In particular, the proportion of females within a school seems to be neg-
atively correlated with the proportion of students with Polish and Bulgarian origin,
however these correlations are reduced and become statistically insignificant when
we add school linear time trends. Within neighbourhoods we find no association
between the proportion of females within a neighborhood and students’ observable
characteristics. All the regressions include year fixed effects. These results suggest
that cohort-to-cohort changes in the proportion of female students within a school
and within a neighborhood seem to be uncorrelated with changes in students’ ob-
served characteristics.
We also examine whether changes in the proportion of female students within
a school and within a neighborhood are related to changes in the logarithm of
school enrollment. As reported in the first row of Table 3.2 there seem to be a
negative association between changes in the proportion of females within a school
and changes in the logarithm of school enrolment. Both, the OLS and within school
regressions produce estimates negative and statistically significant at 10% . However,
this correlation largely reduces and becomes insignificant when school specific time
trends are added.
One could still have concerns that students might react to the unpredicted
changes in gender compositions. Although students are assigned to schools based
on geographical characteristics and it is not easy to switch school, one could still
be worried that students might drop out from or switch to another school after
being exposed to this information. For example, students who are in schools where
the proportion of girls is high/low could drop out. Or transfers of students could
be observed that might be correlated to the observed proportion of females in a
given school. We address this concern by looking at the correlation between the
proportion of female students in a school and the probability that a student drops
out from or switch to another school in that year. We use the smaller sample of
schools because only for these schools we have data for multiple years and we can
identify students who drop out and transfers.
Our dependent variables are: a dummy variable that takes the value of one
if the student drops out from school and a dummy that takes the value of one if
the student is transferred to this school at the beginning of the school year. Table
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3.5 reports the outcome means and the regression estimates separately for boys and
girls. The first row in each panel indicates that students’ mobility from and to a
school is low. Approximately 8% of boys and girls drop out from school in the
twelfth grade and around 6-8% of boys and girls respectively transfer to another
school at the beginning of the twelfth grade. The second row in each panel reports
the regression estimates when school linear trends as well as school and time fixed
effects are added. All estimates are small and statistically insignificant. Overall,
changes in the proportion of females within a school seem to be uncorrelated with
students’ mobility across schools and drop out rates.
3.5 Results and Discussion
Table 3.6 shows the linear probability model estimates for the decision to enrol
in college. Columns (1) and (2) report the effects of the proportion of enrolled
students in year t on a student’s decision to enrol in college in year t. Columns
(3) and (4) report the effects of the proportion of enrolled students in year t-1 on
a student’s decision to enrol in college in year t. Each cell in the first and second
row in Table 365 shows the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. The
estimates presented are based on four different specifications. All specifications
include track and year fixed effects. Columns (1) and (3) include school fixed effects
and school specific linear trends. Columns (2) and (4) include neighbourhood and
neighbourhood specific linear trends. In all specifications we control for a student’s
gender and admission score. We also include a dummy for students who were born
in the first quarter of each year, following Angrist and Krueger 1992, who found
significant differences in school outcomes for those students.
The coefficients of interest are positive in year t and statistically significant,
revealing strong positive externalities at all levels. An increase of a hundred per-
cent in the proportion of same-age school peers who enrol in college increases one’s
probability of enrol in college by 8.6 percent, ceteris paribus. This effect decreases
at the neighborhood level. In particular, an increase of a hundred percent in the
proportion of same-age neighbours who enrol in college increases one’s probability of
enrol in college by 4.3 percent, ceteris paribus. Coefficients of interest are negative
for year t-1 and not very precise.
However, OLS estimates are likely to be bias due to endogeneity issues and
the reflection problem. To address these but also further potential unobserved het-
erogeneity issues, we employ the novel identification strategy of relying on variation
in gender composition to explain differences in mean college enrollment in school
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and neighborhood level. We use an instrumental variable approach to explore social
interactions in space and time. Our instrument, gender composition, is likely to
affect mean college enrollment since female-heavy school environments are found to
be less disruptive and less violent (Lavy and Schlosser 2011).
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report first and second stage estimates, respectively. Both
tables distinguish between social interactions among same-age peers and one-cohort-
older peers. Each cell in the first and second row in Table 3.7 shows the estimated
coefficient from a separate regression. In our setup, the proportion of girls is a strong
predictor of mean enrollment as all first stage estimates are positive and statistically
significant at 1%. As we observe in Table 3.7, our instrument is a better predictor
of mean enrollment at the school rather than the neighborhood level. In particular,
an increase of a hundred percent in the proportion of same-age girls within a school
increases mean enrollment by 13.3 % whereas an increase of a hundred percent in
the proportion of same-age girls within a neighborhood increases mean enrollment
by 8.5%. When we consider last year’s proportion of girls then the coefficient of
interest declines. In particular, a 100% increase in the percentage of girls in the
previous cohort within a school increases this year’s mean enrollment by 12.3 %.
Furthermore, mean college enrollement within a neighborhood increases by 10.2%
if the percentage of girls in the previous year increases by 100%.
Our second stage estimates suggest positive social interactions in education
decisions through space and time, with the size of the effect depending on the size
of the reference group. Each cell in the first and second row in Table 3.8 shows the
estimated coefficient from a separate regression. In Table 3.8, we observe that a
hundred percent increase in the proportion of students who enrol in college within
one’s school in a given year, increases a student’s probability to enrol in college
by 12.6 % in the same year. Similarly, a student is 7% more likely to enrol in
college in a given year if the proportion of students who enrol in college in his
neighborhood increases by a hundred percent in that year. We find positive and
significant spillover effects among peers in consecutive cohorts. Intuitively, social
interactions among students of consecutive cohorts are important, as older peers
may function as role models or may provide access to information. We find that
a hundred percent increase in the proportion of students attending college within
one’s school or within one’s neighborhood a year before, increases his probability
of enrolling in college by 29.1% or 9.6 % percent respectively. Year and track fixed
effects are included in all specification. When we exploit within school variation, we
control for school fixed effects and school specific time trends. When we use within
neighborhood variation, we control for neighborhood and neighborhood specific time
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trends.
Moreover, we explore social interactions in the decision to study in a different
city. Educational mobility is found in the literature to be greatly affected by social
norms, labor market structure and income (Tremblay 2005). We focus on those
students who enrol in college between 2004 and 2009 (sample size: 355,808). Our
models include controls for school or neighbourhood, year and area unobserved time-
invariant characteristics. We begin our analysis by estimating specifications (6) and
(7) using standard OLS. Our estimates reveal positive social interactions among
same-cohort peers and smaller positive externalities coming from students in the
previous cohort. Table 3.9 reports the effects of the proportions of migrated students
on the decision to migrate of same-cohort or one-cohort-older students using a linear
probability model. These estimates show mostly a negative relationship between
mean migration and a student’s decision to migrate to another city. However, the
linear probability model estimates are biased due to reflection and endogeneity. Thus
we use the proportion of female peers in one’s reference group as an instrumental
variable.
Table 3.10 reports first stage estimates. Each column is coming from a sep-
arate regression. All coefficients of interest are positive and statistically significant.
Again the percentage of female students is a better predictor for the mean migra-
tion within a school rather than within a neighbourhood. Ou first stage estimates
suggest that changes in the percentage of female peers have significant effects on
mean migration in school and neighbourhood among same-cohort students but also
in consecutive cohorts. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) are higher than the
estimates in columns (3 and (4) respectively implying that the effects are stronger
in year t rather than t-1.
Our second stage estimates are reported in Table 3.10. Each column in based
on a separate regression. The coefficients of interest are all positive. Our findings
suggest significant positive externalities among same-cohort students but significant
and smaller positive externalities among students in consecutive cohorts.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated the effects of social interactions on a student’s
education decisions of college enrollment and academic mobility. Despite the vast
literature on the topic, two crucial identification challenges remain: common corre-
lated group effects and simultaneity.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we propose a new ap-
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proach in alleviating challenges in identifying spillover effects by using time lagged
group characteristics. Second, we provide evidence on social interactions using a
special institutional setting that allows for spatial variation of group characteristics.
So far, the existing literature on social interactions has focused almost exclusively on
scholastic performance. The only exemptions to our knowledge are Sacerdote 2011
who identify the effect of social interactions on drinking, drug use, and criminal
behavior and Giorgi et al. 2007 who find significant effects on the choice of college
major.
When social interactions are not taken into account, educational treatments
may result in misallocation of resources and may fall short of policy goals. Our
results aim to inform public policies that target ability mismatch.
We employ instrumental variable techniques to estimate utility linkages at
different space and time levels. We battle the reflection problem and the endogeneity
issues by using time lagged school and neighborhood student gender compostion as
an instrument. Using repeated cross-sectional data, we exploit within-school and
within-neighborhood cohort-to-cohort variation to examine the effect of random
changes in gender composition on mean college enrollment. Then we look at the
effect on a student’s decision to enrol in college.
We find that the choices of a student’s peers affect their decision to enrol in
college and migrate to another city to pursue tertiary education. We use a novel
dataset from Greece that contains the universe of high school graduates from 2004
to 2009. We focus our analysis on four reference groups: same-cohort peers in
school, one-cohort-older peers in school, same-cohort peers in neighbourhood and
one-cohort-older peers in neighbourhood.
Our evidence supports the hypothesis that individuals derive utility from
conformity or have access to information, with the size of the externality decreasing
in space distance. Our results show that one is more likely to enrol in college
and move to another city to pursue post secondary education when many of his
peers make the same choices. A hundred percent increase in the percentage of
one-cohort-older peers within a school and within a neighborhood who enrolled
in college increases a student’s probability of college enrollment by 29.1 and 9.6
percent, respectively. In addition, a hundred percent increase in the percentage of
same-cohort students who enrol in college within a school and within a neighborhood
increases one’s own probability to enrol in college by 12.6 and 7 percent respectively.
While our paper has examined several important determinants of college
enrollment and migration decision, several avenues of future research remain. Un-
derstanding the mechanism that underlies social interactions is the next big question
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in the literature. Future research could push forward the front of understanding the
mechanism that underlies social interactions.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: Individual Level
First quarter of birth 0.16 0.368 0 1 355,808
Female 0.567 0.495 0 1 355,808
National Exams Score 13.16 4.062 0.52 19.95 355,808
If enrolled 0.812 0.391 0 1 355,808
Mobile students 0.748 0.434 0 1 260,472
Specialty in Classics 0.365 0.481 0 1 355,808
Specialty in Natural Science 0.154 0.361 0 1 355,808
Specialty in Technical Studies 0.484 0.5 0 1 355,808
Postcode Income (Euro, 2009) 29,464 8,441 9,573 122,879 355,808
Aggregate Enrollment 60,206 6,372 52,450 68,136 355,808
Panel B: School Level
Private 0.081 0.266 0 1 1,319
Income if private (Euro, 2009) 30,575 18,378 16,085 122,879 1,319
National score if private 13.69 2.70 4.7 17.34 1,319
Experimental 0.022 0.149 0 1 1,319
Income if experimental (Euro, 2009) 29,754 14,775 17,583 74,798 1,319
National score if experimental 14.40 1.00 12.23 16.17 1,319
Public 0.89 0.31 0 1 1,319
Income if public (Euro, 2009) 19,327 5,565 9,573 74,798 1,319
National score if public 12.26 1.56 2.97 16.36 1,319
Urban 0.898 0.301 0 1 1,319
Distance to nearest college 10.871 24.083 0.105 1095.452 1,319
campus(in miles)
No of students in each school 46 34 0.16 179 1,319
Panel C: Neighborhood Level
No of schools in each neighborhood 4.449 5.014 2 35 250
No of students in each neighborhood 929.291 1,246.298 8 10,559 250
Note: Data span six cohorts 2004-2009 of 60.119 students on average. Number of schools: 1319.
Among those 413 high schools are in Athens or the surrounding suburbs. The national exam score
ranges from 0 to 20. Mobile students are those who move to a different city in order to study.
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Figure 3.1: Map of schools
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Table 3.2: BALANCING TESTS FOR PROP. OF FEMALES IN SCHOOL
WHOLE SAMPLE SMALLER SAMPLE
OLS School FE School FE OLS School FE School FE
+school linear +school linear
time trends time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logEnrollment -0.075 -0.074 0.004 -0.125 -0.125 0.006
(0.036)* (0.036)* (0.024) (0.053)* (0.054)* (0.048)
EarlyEnrollment -0.002 0.005 0.0009 -0.003 -0.006 0.0010
(0.019) (0.019) (0.001) (0.016) (0.016) (0.001)
Age -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
Ethnicity
Greece 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Albany 0.004 0.004 0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Bulgaria -0.060 -0.060 -0.033
(0.027)* (0.027)* (0.022)
Italy -0.010 -0.010 -0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006)
Russia -0.012 -0.012 0.011
(0.027) (0.027) (0.017)
Poland -0.054 -0.054 -0.022
(0.024)* (0.024)* (0.019)
Ukraine -0.003 -0.003 0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
N 355,808 355,808 355,808 18,670 18,670 18,670
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school level. A constant is also included. *,**,*** denotes
significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. The table reports OLS and school fixed effects
estimates from separate regressions. Columns (3) and (6) report school fixed effects estimates having
added school linear time trends. Year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.3: BALANCING TESTS FOR PROP. OF FEMALES IN NEIGHBOURHOOD
WHOLE SAMPLE SMALLER SAMPLE
OLS neighb. FE neighb. FE+ OLS neighb.FE neighb. FE+
neighb. linear neighb. linear
time trends time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logEnrollment -0.081 -0.080 0.002 -0.089 -0.089 0.003
(0.048) (0.050) (0.035) (0.050) (0.055) (0.031)
EarlyEnrollment 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.035) (0.007) (0.007) (0.023)
Age 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Ethnicity
Greece 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Albany -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Bulgaria 0.002 0.002 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Italy -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Russia 0.005 0.005 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Poland -0.002 -0.002 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004)
Ukraine -0.010 -0.010 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
N 355,808 355,808 355,808 18,670 18,670 18,670
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. A constant is also included. *,**,***
denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. The table reports OLS and
neighborhood fixed effects estimates from separate regressions. Columns (3) and (6) report
neighborhood fixed effects estimates having added neighborhood linear time trends. Year dummies
are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for smaller sample and population
Smaller Sample Population
Mean Mean Difference Std. Dev.
log Postcode income 9.962 9.968 0.006 (0.014)
Private school 0.080 0.081 -0.001 (0.001)
Public school 0.897 0.899 -0.002 (0.003)
Experimental school 0.020 0.022 0.002 (0.003)
Urban 0.899 0.898 0.001 (0.001)
Note: 18,670 obs. in smaller sample and 355,808 obs. in population. 45 schools in
sample, 1319 schools in population.
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Table 3.5: Estimation results : Drop out and Transfers




Outcome mean 0.080 0.078
Regression estimates 0.060 0.020
(0.046) (0.038)
Transfers
Outcome mean 0.068 0.075
Regression estimates 0.020 -0.052
(0.075) (0.071)
Note: The table reports means of the dependent variable
(first row) and estimates (second row) for the effects of
the proportion of females on the probability that a stu-
dent leaves school the following year. We use the smaller
sample here of 45 schools. Clusters at school level. All
regressions include controls for student characteristics.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level. All re-
gressions include school fixed effects, year fixed effects

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Externalities in the Classroom:
Identification of returns to
absences and peer effects
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4.1 Introduction
Most educational systems rely on lectures and class meetings as a means of in-
struction. This is even more prevalent when secondary or pre-tertiary education is
considered. Nevertheless, class attendance is not always perfect. Lecture learning is
based on group learning, which may not be the optimal learning style for everyone.
As a result, many students decide to skip class when given the opportunity. In a
classroom, students compete for the attention and time of the instructor. Thus,
their consumption of education induces externalities on one another. Romer [1993]
claims that college students in three elite U.S. universities were found to perform
better when attending classes and completing homework. Nevertheless, this claim
may apply for only a small part in the right tail of the ability distribution in a given
society. Lectures in classrooms with samples that reflect the actual ability distri-
bution of students may not run completely smoothly. To give an example, students
who act up or disrupt the lecture may be more likely to be found in non-elite schools.
The question that arises here is whether someone should attend class or stay and
study at home given their ability ceteris paribus.
The literature regarding class absenteeism is divided into two main cate-
gories: one refers to the reasons for students being absent from class (Levine 1992,
Chong et al. 2009) and the second one is concerned with the effect of students’ ab-
senteeism on their scholastic outcomes (Romer 1993, Caviglia Harris 2006, Chen and
Lin 2008, Arulampalam et al. 2012, Latif and Miles 2013). Most of these papers use
college and field specific class attendance data. In particular, most of these papers
use data regarding Economics, Accounting or Management students. The majority
of these studies look at correlations and find a negative relationship between stu-
dents’ absenteeism and academic performance or a negligible one (Caviglia Harris
2006). Evidence from the existing literature suggests that class attendance improves
educational outcomes. Lin and Chen 2006 using a sample of 129 college students
in Taiwan find a 4% exam score improvement associated with higher class atten-
dance. A subsequent study by the same authors Chen and Lin 2008 involved an
experiment where different sections of the same college course were subject to ran-
dom changes in the curriculum although everyone sat the same exam at the end
of the semester. The authors found that having the instructor cover all of the ma-
terial improved score by as high as 18%. Latif and Miles 2013 used panel data of
exam scores of Canadian college students to measure the effect of class attendance on
exam performance. They find that when controlling for student heterogeneity, exam
performance is positively related to class attendance. This is the first study that
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attempts to control for endogeneity but no exogenous variation is exploited. Similar
results have been obtained when college classes on science Moore 2006 or economics
Cohn and Johnson 2006 are considered. Arulampalam et al. 2012 use panel data to
identify the causal relationship between class attendance and students’ University
performance. This is the only causal study in this literature. Focusing on Economics
students, they use quantile regression analysis and find that skipping classes leads
to poorer performance. Interestingly, they highlight that the relationship between
class attendance and students’ performance may vary with student ability. Cav-
iglia Harris 2006 examines the impact of mandatory attendance of microeconomic
classes on students’ college performance. After accounting for students’ motivation,
he finds that class attendance does not impact grades. This is the only paper that
finds a negligible effect between class attendance and students’ academic outcomes.
Despite the rich literature that involves college data, there is little evidence that the
same results hold in a less filtered context, like high schools.
In this paper, we investigate the causal relationship between class attendance
and exam performance. Our approach exploits a natural experiment that increased
the absence allowance of high school students by fifty hours only if their grade
point average exceeded a threshold in the previous grade. In our context, senior
year students are maximizing their end-of-year test scores by choosing how much
time to spend in and outside classroom. The end-of-year exam performance is very
crucial for students’ post-secondary placement because it determines the university
entrance score. The treatment offers exogenous variation by relaxing the budget
constraint only for some students, whose marginal utility of time may be higher
than the average.
In the institutional setting examined here high school students in the senior
year usually prepare for the university admission exams. Admission to tertiary
education is based solely on test scores achieved at the end of the senior year. In
order to apply for university admission, students take exams in a specific number
of subjects once per year. In this context, students are to allocate studying time
between attending classes in school and studying at home for the national exams.
The basic idea behind the reform was to relax the budget constraint for the high-
achieving students and allow them to strategically manipulate the additional hours
of excused absences they were provided with. In the second term and just before
the national exams, it might be beneficial for high achieving students to spend time
at home revising past exams or focusing on specific subjects than attending classes
in school.
Using an instrumental variable method, we identify the causal effect of class
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attendance on exam performance. We exploit exogenous variation generated by the
reform to examine the causal path between attendance and school performance in
a natural experiment context. We control for individual-specific, school-specific,
year-specific and grade-specific heterogeneity by using longitudinal data on exam
performance of students in consecutive grades.
Our findings suggest that even when students can choose when to be absent
from class, the returns to absences are negative. It is not very common for students
to be allowed to choose when to skip classes. We find that students are more absent
from class by 15 hours on average when there are provided with the additional
hours of excused absences. We also find that an additional day of absence from
school decreases a student’s gpa and math score by 0.1 and greek language score by
0.08 of a standard deviation. The effects are larger for female students, indicating
that female students may lose more from skipping classes. Our results suggest that
attendance is an important driver of school performance.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that identifies the returns to absences
using a quasi-experimental approach. By using data of students who attend public
schools, which is the case for more than ninety percent of the universe of high school
students, we avoid truncating the observed support of the ability distribution. We
have collected transcript data of the three last grades of high school from 98 schools
in Greece. The lack of selection issues allows us to identify returns to absences which
contributes to the external validity of our study.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 describes a
description of the institutional setting. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4
presents a regression discontinuity approach and section 4.5 proposes an identifi-
cation using an absences law instrument. Section 4.6 presents some heterogeneous
effects and lastly section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Background
It is useful to provide some background on the design of the institutional setting
in which our natural experiment takes place. Public high schools are the norm in
Greece as only around 8 percent of students attend private high school1. Assignment
to high school schools is based on geographical proximity, namely a school district
system. Every high school offers the same curriculum and funding is a linear function
1Descriptive statistics from a dataset that covers the universe of high school graduates-dataset
used in the previous Chapter of this thesis- between 2003 and 2011 show that 90% of students
attend public schools, 2% attend public experimental (charter) schools and 8% attend private high
schools. There are 1319 high schools in Greece, of which 112 are private and 23 are experimental.
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of the number of students. Teachers’ quality characterictics such as education and
experience are not taken into account for allocation of teachers to schools. By law,
assignment to classrooms is based on alphabetical order.
Up until the end of the school year 2005-2006, every student could have 50
hours of unexcused and 64 hours of excused absence from class within a given year.
So a student can be absent from class fo 114 hours in total without a penalty. An
hour of absence can be excused only by a doctor or someone with the child’s custody
-usually the parents. Only whole days of absence can be excused. For example, if a
student goes to school late in the morning or if they decide to skip school midday,
their absences cannot be excused. The penalty for exceeding the number of allowed
absences is to repeat the grade.
In late spring 2006, the Ministry of Education passed a new bill that regu-
lated the number of allowed hours of absence from school. The new policy was not
pre-announced or discussed publicly before it was announced. The new bill pro-
vided eligible twelfth grade students with 50 additional hours of excused absences.
Eligibility was determined based on past grade point average (GPA). In particular,
every student who had received a GPA higher than 15/20 in the previous grade
(eleventh grade) was eligible to take up more absences this year. In our analysis, we
use the graduating class of 2006 as a control group and the graduating class of 2007
as the treated group. We use only the graduating class of 2007 as the treated group
because this cohort was surprised by the reform. The timing of the new policy did
not allow students to choose a different effort level and manipulate their eleventh
grade results. Students had already taken their school end of year exams when the
reform was announced.
Students view the number of hours they can be absent from school with no
penalty as an “allowance” and they tend to use it right before important exams
during the school year in order to prepare. For example, when we look at absences
during the first and second semester separately (the school year consists of two
semesters), we see that absences in the second semester are much higher, which
makes sense as students could better prepare for the final exams when most of
the module curriculum is covered. This is even more pronounced for high achieving
students. In Figure 4.1, we observe the twelfth grade total absences patterns by term
for each decile of tenth grade performance (gpa). High achieving students tend to
be more absent from school in the second term while the opposite is observed for
low achieving students. It is also unlikely that students are more frequently sick in
the second term than in the first one. Weather conditions in Greece would work to
the other direction, given that the first school term coincides with the winter period
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when students are more likely to be sick. This figure provides evidence that high
achieving students might strategically manipulate their absences in order to prepare
for important exams. The school term is designed in a way that it gives only one
study/revision week for preparation after the end of the school term and before the
beginning of the exam period.
Students take national-standardised exams that matter for both high school
graduation and university admission. The format of the national exams is the same
as the one of the school exams in the previous grades and they are externally marked
and proctored.
It is worth mentioning that by design lectures of the same subject are usually
spread out within the weekly schedule of classes. This is important because one may
worry that eligible students might skip classes of a particular subject. This strategic
selection of classes is not entirely possible because only whole days of absence can
be excused.
Around sixty percent of school subjects are core education ones and the
remaining consist of electives and specialization/track courses. Unlike other ed-
ucational systems, in Greece students remain in their assigned classroom for the
majority of school periods instead of moving to different rooms depending on the
subject being taught. This setting guarantees that a student’s peer group remains
the same for a series of courses, including greek language and mathematics, consid-
ered in our analysis.
4.3 Data
We have collected hand collected data from a large randomized sample of high
schools in Greece. For this study we focus on public schools (Sample: 98 schools,
11,239 students). This novel dataset includes every student that graduated from
one of the sampled schools between 2006 and 2007 and contains panel information
from the following sources:
1. Administrative data from the High Schools containing course taking informa-
tion and exam grades in each of the last three years of secondary education,
class identifier, class size 2, gender, year of birth and graduation year. For
each student we also know how many hours were they absent from their class
in the eleventh and the twelfth grade. We know how many absence hours
2corr (class size, income)=0.149,corr (class size, experimental)=0.249, corr (class size, ur-
ban)=0.179
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did the parents excused and how many hours of students’ absences remained
unexcused.
2. School specific information such as name of school, type of school (private,
public3, experimental4), geographical location.
3. The Ministry of Finance provided us with average net income information at
the postcode of the school in 2009 Euro.
4. The Ministry of Internal Affairs provided us with urban density information.
Urban areas are those with more than 20,000 inhabitants.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for our sample in grade 12 (11,239
students). Students are on average 50 hours absent from school in grade 11 and 76
hours absent in grade 12. Out of these, 20 and 42 hours respectively are excused.
In addition, 57% of students are females in our sample and 95% of students attend
a high school in an urban area.
Table 4.2 presents some mean comparisons between 2006 and 2007 which
are the control cohort and the treated cohort respectively. Although we do not
observe a significant difference between the percentage of students who are female,
attend public/experimental and urban schools, what is actually very interesting is
that there is no difference between students’ eleventh grade GPA between 2006
and 2007. The eleventh grade GPA determines a student’s eligibility status. This
confirms our prior belief that the reform came as a surprise to these students.
A limitation of our data is that we do not observe which exact hour a student
is absent from class ie. if he skips a class for an important subject or a class for a
subject that is not nationally examinable. However, a student cannot choose when
to skip some classes within a school day. Otherwise, these hours of absence cannot
be excused.
4.4 The effect around the cut-off
4.4.1 Strategy
We start our analysis by looking at students who are around the eleventh grade gpa
cut-off (or the eligibility cut-off). By using a Regression Discontinuity design we can
identify the effect of the additional absences on students’ academic performance in
the treated year. So, we will compare students who are just to the left with students
3Students are assigned to public schools according to a school district system.
4Admission to experimental schools is based on a lottery.
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who are just to right of the cut-off value in the treated year (2007). Students with
eleventh grade gpa below 15 cannot exploit the additional hours of absences that
students with gpa above 15 are offered. Within each school, we rank students
according to their eleventh grade gpa and identify those who are above and below
the threshold of gpa=15. Let t0 take the value of 15 and ti be student’s gpa in the
eleventh grade.
The first stage regression can be specified as:
TAi = αf1(ti) + ψ1[ti > t0] + ω(1)
where 1[ti > t0] is an indicator for whether a student is eligible to be more
absent i.e. if his eleventh grade gpa is greater than or equal to the threshold value
of 15/20, ti is the eleventh grade gpa of student i and f1(ti) is a control function
for the gpa of student i. We also use specification (1) to apply a first differences
approach. We do that because there might be individual specific unobserved char-
acteristics that are omitted and might affect our variables of interest. By taking
first differences of outcomes and covariates between twelfth and eleventh grade, we
get rid of potential time invariant omitted variables. Specification (1) will tell us if
students just to the right of the cut-off use the additional hours of absence, when
they are allowed to do so, compared to students who are just to the left of the cut-
off and they are not allowed. By using the first difference version of specification
(1), we will find how many more hours absences do students to the right of the
cut-off use compared to their eleventh grade hours of absences with regards to the
counterfactual group of students.
The idea behind the regression discontinuity design which was initially pro-
posed by Thistlethwaite and Campbell [1960] is that discontinuities like the above
can be used to identify the causal effect of scoring in the eleventh grade above
15/20. Intuitively, assume that the gpa is smoothly related to characteristics that
affect academic performance. Having assumed that, pupils with scores just above
the threshold value will provide a proper control group for pupils with scores just
below the threshold value. This is visualised in Figure 4.2. Then any differences in
the outcomes of those students can be attributed to the fact that some students are
eligible to be more absent from school due to the reform.
The reduced form equation that will estimate the effect of being eligible to
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be more absent from school on academic outcomes, can be described as:
Yi = δ(ti) + γ1[ti > t0] + ei(2)
where: Yi is the standardised twelfth grade score in Modern Greek, Mathe-
matics and the twelfth grade gpa for student i ,
Results will be presented for small enough neighborhood areas of different sizes
around the cut-off. When we do that, δ(ti) will be constant and γ will identify
the causal effect of being allowed to be more absent from school on test scores,
non-parametrically (Hahn et al. [2001]).
4.4.2 Results
Our results are produced using the non-parametric approach discussed above, im-
plementing a local linear regression constructed with a triangular kernel. The first
stage is not very strong. This is something that we can also observe in Figures 4.2
and 4.3. In Table 3, we present the estimates for regression discontinuity estimates
using six different bandwidths. In columns 1,2,3 (Table 4.3) we restrict the sample
to those students who are 0.5/20 5, 1/20, 1.5/20 to the left and the right of the
cut-off respectively. In columns 4,5,6 (Table 4.3) we increase the bandwidth further
using the bandwidths suggested by Calonico et al. [2014], Imbens and Kalyanara-
man [2012] and Ludwig and Miller [2007] respectively. Using these bandwidths, we
do not find evidence that students just to the right of the cut-off used more hours of
allowed absences compared to students just to the left of the cut-off. The coefficients
are positive but are statistically insignificant.
Then we present reduced form results (Table 4.4). We present results for
each subject separately (modern greek, mathematics and gpa in twelfth grade). We
do not find any consistent pattern across columns. Only the first difference esti-
mates in Mathematics (Panel B) are statistically significant in some specifications.
Students who are eligible to be more absent from class, experience a decrease in
their standardised score in Mathematics by 0.15-0.30 standard deviations.
These results make us think that there is no effect around the threshold
but the reform might affect students who are farther away from the cut-off. The
impact of class attendance on students’ performance may vary with student ability
(Arulampalam et al. 2012). The reform might not be used by students who are just
5The maximum score a student can get is 20. 0.5/20 corresponds to 2.5 out of 100
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to the right of the cut-off. Not all eligible students might be interested in using
the additional excused hours of absences that they were provided with. Intuitively,
students who are at the top percentiles of the ability distribution might decide
to spend more hours preparing for the national exams. The education literature
suggests that there is the so called self-regulated learning that is more pronounced
for the high achieving students. (Barry J. and Manuel 1990,Nicola and Debra 2006).
The intuition is that high achieving students might be/or believe that they
are more constructive when studying at home rather than staying in the classroom,
especially if it is noisy. The research on self regulated-learning suggests that these
students might set goals for their learning and monitor, regulate, and control their
cognition, motivation, and behaviour better than students of lower academic ability.
So the marginal utility of spending an additional hour in the class might be different
for a student who had an eleventh grade gpa equal to 16 and another student who
had a gpa equal to 19 although there are both eligible to use the reform. This makes
us think that there might not be an effect around the performance cut-off (15/20).
As shown in Figure 4.2, some covariates exhibit a jump around the thresh-
old that violate the assumptions of identification of the treatment effects using an
regression discontinuity approach. The RD approach may be inappropriate for iden-
tification if individuals to the left of the cut-off differ in more than one ways from
individuals to the right of the cut-off. To control for individual specific drivers of the
observed behaviour we take first differences of observed variables between twelfth
and eleventh grade. The change in these differences around the cut-off is shown in
Figure 4.3.
The regression discontinuity estimates that look at the effect of the reform
on school performance seem weak. We suspect that this is due to the fact that it
may not be those just above the threshold of eligibility who exploit the new policy
and take up more hours of absence but rather those we are in the right tail of the
distribution due to self-regulated learning.
4.5 Identification using absences law instruments
4.5.1 Empirical Strategy
We then look at the average effect of the reform on all eligible students and not
only those who are just around the cut-off. To do this, we postulate a model where
individuals’ school performance is a function of own hours of absences:
Scoreicsgt = αo + α1TotalAbsencesicstg + α2Seniorit
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+studentFE + schoolFE + icst(3)
where the dependent variable Scoreicsgt is the twelfth grade performance of
student i in class c in school s in grade g and in year t. We include a dummy
variable Seniorit that takes the value 1 if the student is in the twelfth grade to
pick up mean changes in effort due to the high stake exams in the twelfth grade.
Student fixed effects are used to control for all observed and unobserved student
characteristics that are constant over time. This could include student effort and
ability, as well as family related factors like help from parents to help their child with
the homework. We also include school fixed effects to control for any time-invariant
systematic differences across schools.
The dependent variable includes the national exam performance of student
i in two different subjects (greek language and mathematics) and the twelfth grade
gpa. Notice that we exploit the panel aspect of our data. Standard errors are
clustered at the class level. The main coefficient of interest is α1 indicating how total
absences affect a student’s performance. Estimating equation 3 using OLS may lead
to a number of problems, since the variable ”total absences” is endogenous. Bias
may be created by omitted variables that may affect the performance of students
and their decision to stay at home, such as the existence of modern facilities like
interactive boards in some schools. Then the total absences of the student may be
correlated with the error term and that would invalidate the OLS estimates. For
example, the degree of parental monitoring or other individual characteristics such
as self-discipline or the motivation level affect both the hours that students decide
to stay at home and student’ s productivity. We exclude from our analysis students
who enrol into private schools in order to avoid selection issues. Not controlling for
unobserved characteristics, would add another estimation bias.
Furthermore, measurement error would bias the estimation of the parameters
of interest. The bias from measurement error may be less of a threat when this error
is time invariant but even measures of performance and attendance are less than
perfect. An instrumental variables approach can address biases due to selection,
omitted variables and measurement error. Therefore, we exploit the reform in the
absences allowance law to construct an instrument for class attendance.
We mitigate the endogeneity issues by using an instrumental variables ap-
proach in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal effects of interest. We
employ a difference-in-difference approach in order to measure the effect of the re-
form on total absences. In particular, we interact the eligibility status dummy with
the year dummy that takes the value 1 if the new absences law is in place. As out-
lined before, students with an eleventh grade gpa above 15 out of 20 can be more
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absent from school in 2007 compared to 2006. Students with an eleventh grade GPA
below 15 out of 20 have the same allowance in both years. Thus, we use this reform
as a source of exogenous variation for total absences.
The first stage regression is the following:
TotalAbsencesicstg = β1+β2Eligibilityicst+β3Reformt+β4Eligibilityicst∗Reformt
+β5Seniorit + schoolFE + studentFE + icstg(4)
The main instrument for total absences is the interaction between the eli-
gibility status and the reform year dummy. This interaction term in equation (4)
measures the treatment effect of the reform on total absences of eligible students
compared to non-eligible ones. The interaction variable is zero for non-eligible stu-
dents in both years. In 2007, it becomes equal to one only for eligible students.
In order for the reform to be an appropriate instrument for total absences, it must
be correlated with total absences and only affect national exam performance and
twelfth grade gpa through hours of absence.
The outcome variables and the effects of the reform are likely to be correlated
for all students in a given class. Thus, we control for any dependence between obser-
vations within a class by clustering all results at the class level. Using instrumental
variables that stem from the reform relies on the assumption that the reform had
no other effect on a student’s performance than through its effect on the students
absences and peer group quality. It is important to note than any factor coinciding
with the reform, affecting all students in Greece in a similar way, such as a possible
change in exam difficulty, will be captured by the reform year dummy that takes
the value the value 1 for the year 2007 and 0 before. As the unaffected individuals
act as a control group, only factors changing at the same time as the reform may
be potential threat to our identification strategy. To our knowledge there were no
other relevant changes in the institutional setting at the time the reform of interest
was implemented.
Lastly, any difference in difference type strategy relies on the assumption
that treatment and control groups did not follow differential trends. Our dataset
includes only one control cohort (2006) and therefore it’s impossible to examine the
existence of linear or non linear time trends. Nevertheless, as long as individual
specific characteristics are time invariant, controlling for past performance would
net out any factors that may be correlated with assignment in the treatment or
the control group. Overall, we are of the view that the reform provides a valid
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instrument to identify returns to absences and peer effects.
One of the main worries it that eligibility is an endogenous variable. We
do not include cohorts that graduated later than 2007 in the treatment group.
These cohorts might exert more effort in the eleventh grade in order to exceed the
performance threshold and become eligible. We use the graduating cohort of 2007
as the only treated group because the reform was announced after they had taken
their eleventh grade final year exams.
The reform targeted only students that satisfied a specific criterion. However,
this selection was based on a completely observable characteristic that determined
eligibility. We control for the potential endogeneity of the eligibility by including the
eleventh grade gpa in the main specification. The eligibility variable takes the value
zero or one and as a non-linear function of the lagged GPA will not be perfectly
collinear with lagged GPA.
Another worry would be that some schools misreport absences or the eleventh
grade gpa. Teachers have to connect to a central electronic platform and upload the
number of hours that a student is absent from class each month. If we believe that
teachers report school attendance honestly in the first place, it will be difficult to
change these numbers in a later month. Teachers have no incentives to misreport
a student’s school attendance or gpa. A concern would be that teachers in private
schools might receive pressure from parents to misreport attendance or gpa. Private
school teachers are not assigned to schools based on geographical criteria but the
school administration decides the hiring practices. Although we dont believe that
this could happen, one might be concerned that private school teachers might receive
pressure to misreport students attendance or gpa. For these reasons, we excluded
private schools from our analysis.
One may also be concerned that some principals/teachers were not satisfied
by the reform’s rationale and they refused to allow high achieving students to take
the additional absences without a penalty. That would be a concern if there were
many students exceeding the allowance. In fact, the reform allowed some students to
skip school if they wanted but it did not force them to do so. In that sense the effect
of the reform on the actual number of absences taken is the intention to treat effect
(ITT). The average number of hours of total absences used in the twelfth grade is
76 (as we observe in Table 4.1). Even for students in the very right tail of the ability
distribution the constraint is not binding ie. they take on average 80 hours of total
absences (Figure 4.1). This alleviates another concern: teachers might react to the
reform because high achieving students might be more absent from class so their
classes might become nosier. This could happen because low achieving students
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tend to be more disruptive. That could affect a teacher’s productivity in class as
they might become less enthusiastic and motivated. As a consequence, we might
observe a decrease in remaining students score that is not coming from their own
school attendance. However, the first stage estimates that we find are not large
enough to affect a teacher’s motivation and behaviour in class.
We also use the reduced form regression that is essentially a difference-in-
difference estimate of the reform:
Scoresicstg = γ1 + γ2Eligibilityicst + γ3Reformt + γ4Eligibilityicst ∗Reformt
+studentFE + schoolFE + icstg(5)
We regress a student’s score on the instrument proposed above. It compares
changes in students’ scores from the pre to the- post-reform period for eligible stu-
dents to the change between the two years for non-eligible students. If the reform
has a positive effect on the productivity of eligible students we would expect positive
coefficients on the interaction term variable.
4.5.2 IV Results
The reform examined in this paper relaxed the attendance requirements of higher
performing students and allowed them to skip more hours of class. This context
offers itself to identification of the effect of class attendance on exam performance.
The reform provides an exogenous source of variation. This is the eligibility status.
The students considered in our study had no anticipation of the new absences law.
Although the rationale behind the new law was rather to provide non pecuniary
incentives to exert higher effort, in the short run it permits us to identify returns to
absences.
Using both eligible and non-eligible students, we regress a student’s stan-
dardised score in greek Language, mathematics and the twelfth grade gpa on the
instrument proposed above. For students that are either non-eligible or in a year
where the new law is not in place, the interaction term Reform ∗ Eligibility will
take the value 0. Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 report the first stage, second stage and
reduced form estimates.
In all regression we add students and school effects and we cluster the stan-
dard errors at the class level. Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 report the estimates for the
following subjects respectively: Greek Language, mathematics and gpa. The first
stage estimates imply that the reform increased total absences of eligible students
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by around 15 hours compared to non-eligible. This increase in the total absences in
likely coming from students in the very right tail of the ability distribution. Notice
that for students just to the right of the eligibility performance threshold we did
not find a significant effect in the hours of absences taken. The reform is a strong
and highly significant predictor of total absences. Our high F-statistics keep fears
of weak instruments at bay.
Our reduced form estimates are also negative. The reform has a strong
negative effect on eligible students’ score that is always significant at 1%. This
is the case when we use as outcome variables a student’s performance in greek
language, mathematics and the twelfth grade gpa. These results strongly support
the view that the reform can be used as a valid source of exogenous variation in
total absences.
Then, we investigate the effect of hours of total absences on a student’s na-
tional exam performance using the regression model discussed above. Using the
reform as an IV we overcome the problem that the total absences variable is en-
dogenous. Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 report also the second stage estimates. We provide
evidence of negative returns to absences in all subjects. In particular, an additional
hour of absence implies a decrease by 0.012, 0.014 and 0.014 of a standard deviation
in a student’s national exam performance in Greek Language, Mathematics and
gpa respectively. This is approximately similar to our benchmark OLS specifica-
tion result (Table 4.5) for greek language, mathematics and gpa, but the IV results
are almost six times larger than its corresponding benchmark (-0.002 compared to
-0.012). This is of particular interest because these students may decide to be more
absent from class in order to prepare for the senior-year exams. They might think
that self-regulated learning helps them more than attending classes. We find evi-
dence that skipping class even when a student chooses when to do so deteriorates a
student’s performance.
4.6 Heterogeneous Effects
We find that the returns to absences are negative in both subjects used (greek
language and mathematics) and in the twelfth grade gpa. It might be helpful to
investigate if the effects that we find differ based on some characteristics. Under-
standing any possible heterogeneity of the effects of an additional hour of absence
might help the policy discussion by identifying groups of the population that are
likely to disproportionately benefit from particular interventions.
In this section, we examine heterogeneity based on two dimensions: a stu-
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dent’s gender and the size of the class. We run the same regressions as before sepa-
rately for females and males. We use the reform as an instrumental variable and we
report first stage and second stage estimates. In these specifications we control for
student, school and grade fixed effects and we cluster standard errors at the class
level. The IV estimates are reported in Table 4.9,4.10 and 4.11 for the different
dependent variables: national exam performance in greek language, mathematics
and twelfth grade gpa. The first stage estimates are higher for males compared to
females. This means that boys are more absent from class by around 2.5 hours when
they are allowed to do so. However, the effect that each additional hour has on their
standardised score in greek language, mathematics and twelfth grade gpa is smaller
compared to girls. In particular, an additional hour of absence from class is associ-
ated with a loss of 0.010 and 0.014 of a standard deviation in a student’s national
exam performance in greek language for boys and girls respectively. The difference
between the two second stage estimates decline for mathematics. In particular, an
additional hour of absence from class is associated with a loss of 0.013 and 0.014 of
a standard deviation in a student’s national exam performance in mathematics for
boys and girls respectively. In terms of twelfth grade gpa, an additional hour of ab-
sence from class is associated with a loss of 0.011 and 0.017 of a standard deviation
in a student’s gpa for boys and girls respectively.
Then we explore the relationship between student attendance and perfor-
mance for small and big classes separately. In Table 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 we report
the first and second stage estimates separately for students in small and big classes.
We categorise a class as a small one if there are less than 15 students in this class.
Otherwise it is considered as big. Our first stage estimates imply that students are
on average 1 hour more absent from a big compared to a small class. Classes that
consist of more than 15 students might be noisier and thus high-achieving students
might choose to be more absent for 1 more hour when the reform is implemented.
Although the difference between the first stage estimates are relatively small be-
tween small and big classes, this is not the case for the returns to absences. An
additional hour of absence decreases a student’s score in greek by 0.009 and 0.025 of
a standard deviation in big and small classes respectively. Nevertheless, the size of
the loss is larger in big classes in mathematics and gpa compared to small classes.
Future research is required to understand what is the mechanism that drives
these heterogeneous effects. In particular, we need to understand why an additional
day of absence from school hurts females more than it does males but also why the
size of the loss in terms of math score may be larger in smaller classrooms, while the
size of the loss in terms of greek language score may be larger in larger classrooms.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate returns to absences using a natural experiment. We
exploit an unexpected reform that took place in Greece in 2007, that provided
higher performing students with 50 more hours of excused absences from school.
The eligibility status was determined based on a cut-off rule. We start off by using
a Regression Discontinuity approach in order to measure the change in total absences
and exam score due to the reform. Although, no strong effects were observed around
the cut-off, important controls like class size and postcode income do not remain
unchanged around the cut-off. This violates necessary assumption for identification
in the regression discontinuity framework.
Next, we employ a combination of differences-in-differences and instrumental
variables techniques in order to identify returns to absences. An interaction between
eligibility status and year dummy is proposed as an instrument for the endogenous
variable of total absences, to mitigate identification threats like unobserved hetero-
geneity.
Our study is the first one to identify returns to absences using a quasi-
experimental approach. Our findings imply that students take on average 15 more
hours of absence. Our estimates yield significant negative returns to absences in
greek language, mathematics and twelfth grade gpa. Our results suggest that at-
tendance is an important driver of school performance.
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Figure 4.1: Hours of twelfth grade absences per term by prior performance
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Figure 4.2: Regression Discontinuity Figures for Controls
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Figure 4.3: Regression Discontinuity Figures for First Stages with Different Band-
widths
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for full sample
Full Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Born in 1st quarter 0.166 0.33 0 1
12th Grade Greek Language Score 12.50 3.06 0 20
11th Grade Greek Language Score 13.89 3.20 0 20
12th Grade Mathematics Score 10.85 6.39 0 20
11th Grade Mathematics Score 9.90 6.09 0 20
Female 0.57 0.50 0 1
Income (2009 Euro) 22,244 6,322 11,785 48,427
Experimental School 0.05 0.21 0 1
Public School 0.95 0.21 0 1
Urban 0.95 0.21 0 1
11th Grade GPA 14.21 2.85 8.8 20
12th Grade GPA 14.89 2.64 4.9 20
11th Grade Excused Absences 19.54 19.38 0 137
11th Grade Total Absences 49.53 27.38 0 164
12th Grade Excused Absences 42.01 23.91 0 160
12th Grade Total Absences 76.31 28.68 0 371
Note: sample: 11,239 obs.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Treated Control Diff Std. Dev.
Early Enrolment 0.10 0.20 0.11*** 0.00
Female 0.56 0.57 0.01 0.01
Income (2009 Euro) 22,284 22,255 29.12 96.82
Experimental School 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02
Public School 0.96 0.95 -0.01 0.01
Urban 0.95 0.95 0.00 0.00
11th Grade GPA 14.18 14.16 -0.07 0.04
12th Grade GPA 15.01 14.55 -0.46*** 0.04
12th Grade Excused Absences 43.88 36.50 -7.38*** 0.36
12th Grade Total Absences 78.22 70.68 -7.55*** 0.44













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.5: Naive Regression: OLS estimates
OLS
Variable Greek language Mathematics gpa
Total Absences -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.0003)*** (0.0002)*** (0.002)***
Senior year -0.118 -0.242 -0.072***
(0.027)*** (0.017)*** (0.012)***
School FE X X X
Student FE X X X
Sample: 11,238 obs. Standard Errors clustered at class level (377
clusters)
Table 4.6: IV Estimates: Greek Language
First Stage Reduced Form







Senior year 23.602 0.019
(0.990)*** (0.032)
School FE X X




Sample: 11,238 obs. Standard Errors clustered at class
level (377 clusters)
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Table 4.7: IV Estimates: Mathematics
First Stage Reduced Form







Senior year 23.602 0.005
(0.990)*** (0.016)
School FE X X





Sample: 11,238 obs. Standard Errors clustered at class
level (377 clusters)
Table 4.8: IV Estimates: Grade Point Average
First Stage Reduced Form







Senior year 23.602 0.058
(0.990)*** (0.013)***
School FE X X





Sample: 11,238 obs. Standard Errors clustered at class
level (377 clusters)
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Table 4.9: Males vs Females: Greek Language
Females Males
First Stage First Stage







Senior year 25.093 21.524
(1.131)*** (0.984)***
F-Statistic 102.69 116.34
School FE X X
Student FE X X
Second Stage Second Stage
Total Absences -0.014 -0.010
(0.003)*** (0.003)***
Sample: 6,426 Females & 4,812 Males.
Table 4.10: Males vs Females: Mathematics
Females Males
First Stage First Stage







Senior year 25.093 21.524
(1.131)*** (0.984)***
F-Statistic 102.69 116.34
School FE X X
Student FE X X
Second Stage Second Stage
Total Absences -0.014 -0.013
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Sample: 6,426 Females & 4,812 Males.
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Table 4.11: Males vs Females: Grade Point Average
Females Males
First Stage First Stage







Senior year 25.093 21.524
(1.131)*** (0.984)***
F-Statistic 102.69 116.34
School FE X X
Student FE X X
Second Stage Second Stage
Total Absences -0.017 -0.011
(0.002)*** (0.001)***
Sample: 6,426 Females & 4,812 Males.
Table 4.12: Big vs Small Classrooms: Greek Language
Small Big
First Stage First Stage







Senior year 20.000 23.646
(3.081)*** (2.074)***
F-Statistic 13.17 145.40
School FE X X
Student FE X X
Second Stage Second Stage
Total Absences -0.025 -0.009
(0.011)** (0.003)***
Sample: Small if size<15, Big if size>15
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Table 4.13: Big vs Small Classrooms: Mathematics
Small Big
First Stage First Stage







Senior year 20.000 23.646
(3.081)*** (2.074)***
F-Statistic 13.17 145.40
School FE X X
Student FE X X
Second Stage Second Stage
Total Absences -0.008 -0.014
(0.006) (0.003)***
Sample: Small if size<15, Big if size>15
Table 4.14: Big vs Small Classrooms: Grade Point Average
Small Big
First Stage First Stage







Senior year 20.000 24.230
(3.055)*** (2.062)***
F-Statistic 10.45 124.91
School FE X X
Student FE X X
Second Stage Second Stage
Total Absences -0.011 -0.016
(0.006)** (0.002)***
Sample:Small if size<15, Big if size>15
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